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In order to successfully apply the techniques and
theories of management to real-world decision making,
it is necessary to understand the context in which those
decisions are made.
In this vein. Dr. Richard S. Morse, of the Sloan
School of Management at M.I.T., has offered the course
"The Government/Indus try Environment." The purpose of
the course is two-fold: to provide an understanding of
public policy-making, and to investigate a specific
current problem involving the public sector.
The work reported here is a result of that course.
The content and conclusions are those of the authors, and
do not necessarily represent the views of either Dr.
Morse or the Sloan School.
Richard S. Morse
Cambridge, Massachusetts
February 1971
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"Privacy is the claim of Individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others. . . . The
individual's desire for privacy is never
absolute, since participation In society Is
an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process... in the face of
pressures from the curiosity of others and
from the processes of surveillance that
every society sets in order to enforce Its
social norms.
"
—Alan F. Westin
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PART I: SUMiyiARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
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Cne of ti'T; aajor nroblernn of Americpn society todpy
is the lack ol r viidely accepted definltior.i of -Drivacy. 't
"'fcari. one excellent definition exists, as presented by Men
..'est5n, and it hlghlip:hts the constant tradeoff vhich mnst
be made between the individual's desire to be an individual ,
and his desire to be a member of society. In order to preserve
its norms, society sets certain constraints on the individual's
privacy decision, and establishes Institutions to enforce
those constraints. The legal and Constitutional bases for
privacy in America are somewhat vague, with the result that
some institutions have tended to go beyond the limits of
reason in enforcing norms.
The electronic computer, which is an amoral implement for
amplifying man's ability to process lnfU33mAtd,tiL-^riis one tool
which some institutions have misused in constraining privacy.
Piaul£a4tttthese cases lies not with the computer, but with the
institutions themselves. One such institution difi the U.S. ^rmy.
The collection of information is not, however, evil; in
fact, information collection is a prerequisite to civilization.
Given the three basic reasons for collection of data, coupled
with a list of criteria for the evaluation of individual data
banks. It is reasonably straightforward to evaluate exist inj?
Ca' proposed data banks. Such evaluation has historically not
been undertaken.
''hat is needed is a comprehensive national policy for
such evaluations, firmly based in analysis of social costs vs.
social benefits, ana coupled with an effective method of enforce-
ment. Host important of all, hov;ever, is the realization by
2s.ch Antirlcan that the protection of privacy is a job for him.

PART II J PRIVACYt A FRAMEWORK

Justification for Concern
Traditional lack of concemj necessity for
consideration by both individuals and society
as a whole? current state of thought on the
subject.
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JUSTIt'IGATIOK POfi CONCtai
As a nation, we have traditionally failed to carefully
consider questions of fundamental societal values imtll those
values were threatened by the onslought of technological,
economic, or sociological developments. And so It Is with the
basic rights of privacy in our democracy. As the development
of technological resources, exemplified by but not limited to
the high speed digital computer, continues at an increasingly
rapid pace, our abilities to Impinge on personal privacy
are amplified immensely. The combination of an expanding
population, a complex economy, and the increasing availability
of electronic equipment of varying capabilities underscores the
urgency for the formulation of national policies regarding
the wide range of questions related to privacy. We can wait
no longer. According to Dr. Allen Westln, Professor of
Public Law at Columbia University and a prominent leader in
th8 fight to make privacy a national concemi
"Pew values so fundamental to society as privacy
have been left so undefined in social theory or have
been the subject of such vague and confused writing
by social scientists."
(Westin, A., Privacy and Preedom . Ch. 1)
Privacy is a question for everyone to think about}
;
- is not to be left solely to the specialists. Indeed,
every titme someone completes an application for employment,
applies for a driver's license, or applies for a credit card,
he is making a decision related to his privacy. Yet although
most Americans would agree that no one should take a challenge
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to his privacy llgPitly, few thought£fllly weigh the consequences
and Implications of applying for a credit card or answering
an investigator's questions about their neighbors. We should
remember that anytime a transfer of Information occurs, privacy
Is In some way Impinged, whether It be our personal privacy,
that of our friends and neighbors, or the privacy of s©roe
other Individual or organization.
Concurrently with our Individual consideration of
questions of privacy, we must act as a nation to forge
a clear national policy.
The media have consistently demonstrated, an awareness
that questions of privacy must be explored. According to
the New York Times (Aug. 9. 1966), in an editorial regarding
the 1966 proposal for a National Data Bank for collecting
all government files in a central depository!
"Can personal privacy survive the ceaieless
advances of the technological Juggernaut? . . .Aside
from the opportunities for blackmail and from the
likelihood that the record of any single past trans-
gression might damage one for life, this proposed
device would approach the effective end of privacy....*'
The recent empfebsis on the necessity of law and order
coupled with calls from many sectors of the population for
a crackdown on crime and violence has served to emphasize
The urgency of developing a national policy with respect
to privacy, particularly as related to federal, state, and
local governments. A recent editorial in the Wall Street
Journal by David C. Anderson (Nov. ^, 1970) discussed this
problem:
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"... other new technologies grew to have an
even more direct relevance to the Increased threat
to democratic freedoms.
"Recent advances In electronic miniaturization
and other areas vastly Increased the range aad
efficiency of eetvesdropplng devices for example.
"And the imcomfortable Implications of such
Increased capability were hardly diminished by the
desire of some public officials sto claim broad
powers to use It. Attorney General John Mitchell
felt tree to declare imllateraily and rather formally
last year... that Government agents had a right to
eavesdrop on anybody the Attorney General decides
is a threat t* the national security, without any
court review, and without having to disclose what
has been overheard.
"Computers have also had an Impact... It was
disclosed that various agencies of Government had
created a computerized dsiia bank to centralize the
information the Government collects on citizens and
make it available at the punch of a key."
The rhetoric of concern has not been confined to the
media, hovrever. The halls of Congress, from whence any
national legislative limitations on the Invasion of
privacy must emerge, have echoed with considerable condem
on the parts of our elected representatives.
Hearings by the Administrative Practice and Procedure
Subcommittee of the Senate held in 19^5 revealed such
practices as maintaining pe^pholes in ladles' locker rooms
and rest rooms in post offices throughout the country.
During the same hearings, the committee discovered that
Internal Revenue Service agents had utilized mail covers,
ond had in some cases opened first-class mall. Other
controversial practices were also discovered. These
hearings lead Senator Edward Long, Cha±±man of the
subcommittee, to conclude thatt
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VThls Investigation has been but one small
battle In the campaign agalnsfe Big Brother, but
It is my earnest hope that It has demonstrated that
the only way to beat him Is by constant exposure
of his bully boys and agents, and by forcing him
to realize that, like the rest of us, they are going
to be hel^ responsible for their actions."
(Long, E. , Playboy , n.d.)
U. S, Congressman Cornelius Gallagher, speaking to
the Ninth Practlcvim on Practical Politics (Jersey City,
State College, May 7» I968), discussed some conclusions
he had dravm from the hearings on the National Data Bank
proposali
"...it is m^ opinion that the most important
domestic problem facing our Nation today is re-
establishing the stability of our urban oriented
culture. New methods of data manipulation are
necessary to deal with our expanding and highly
mobile population, but the efficiency of computerized
general categories may be programming out of our
society the awareness of those personal differences
which define humanity,
"
Addressing a symposium conducted by ? Computer Audit
Systems, Congressman Frank Horton, a member of the Special
Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy of the Committee on
Government Operations, also discussed the problems of
government data banks
t
"Our concern then, and our concern now, is that
a massive compilation of citizen records would
present an unacceptable threat to the continuation
of individual privacy and democratic safeguards,"
(
Senator Sam Ervln, a leading proponent of strict
controls against invasions of privacy, considers the
problem of sufficient magnitude to warrant a Federal
agency devoted exclusively to protection against tech-
nological Invasion of privacy. Speaking to the Senate

-13-
on November 10, I969. he stated
j
"Millions of private citizens face. .. surveillance
by computers in private Industry as well as in
Government. Their problems are equally deserving
of attention.
"Due to the national dimensions of this problem
and its complicated nature, it is well neigh impossible
for Congress, by any one law, to control the dangers
posed to our society by computer technology.
"For this reason, In addition to bills
prohibiting the collection and use of federal data
on individuals, there is an immediate need for
establishment of an Independent regulatory agency
to control this new communication-surveillance
system.
V
(Congressional Record, vol 115/no. 18^)
The executive branch of the federal government has
also expressed concern for the problems of privacy, although
tangible guidelines for protecting citizens from invasions
of privacy have not been promulgated to any significant
extent. Recognition of the existence of the problem can
be documented, although constructive and definite action
appears to be lacking. According to Senator Ervln, in
his comments announcing the publication of hearings on
privacy and the census
1
"The President has thus far offered no constructive
solutions to the constitutional rights Issues raised
in these hearings. The Administration has taken the
easy way out. It has appointed a Presidential
Commission to study the problem of government
statistical questionnaires. So far we have heard
nothing from it. . . . Another commission, appointed
over a year ago by Secretary of Commerce Stans, has
also not been heard from so far."
(Press release of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights)
In a letter to Senator Ervln, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare — Elliot Richardson — expressed his
department's concern over privacy
«
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" Social Security numbers are currently being
used throughout Industry and government as a means
of clearly Identifying Individuals and avoiding the
confusion and mistakes which can arise when a number
of individuals have common or similar names.
. .
.
Only in certain clearly defined and very limited
circumstances — circumstances involving national
security, administration of the Internal Revenue
Act, and administration of the Social Security
program itself — could they be used In obtailLning
Information from Social Security about an individual
without his prior consent..,. Despite those restrictions,
the Department is concerned that if the Social
Security number were used too t)roadly, such wide-
spread use and dependence upon the number might
lend itself to abuses of individual privacy. Because
of this concern, the Social Security Administration
is currently reviewing the policies governing the
issuance, maintenance, and usage of the Social
Security n^^mber."
(Congressional Record, v.ll3» no. 108)
In a series of hearings before Congress in past years,
the Census Bureau has repeatedly testified about questions
of privacy. According to Professor Arthur Miller of the
University of Michigan!
"The Qensus Bureau has an unequalled record among
Federal agencies in preserving the confidentiality
of personal informationj to my knowledge there
are no documented oases of abusive handling of an
individual's census record."
(Transcript of "The Advocates", p. 5)
Yet Senator Ervin thought it noteworthy to point out that
by 1970 the Federal government's expenditures for statistical
data gathering will exceed ^200 million including the costs
for the Bureau of the Census. He noted that an American
13 required by law to answer such questions as
"Do you have a flush toilet?"
and
"How much did you earn in 1967?"
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Another Census Bureau questionnaire asked a sampling of
elderly persons such questions asi
"Taking things all together, would you say
you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy
these days?
"Do you have artificial dentiires?"
(Congressional Record, v. 115, no. 18^)
Clearly these questions are of a personal nature and represent
an invasion of privacy. To what degree were these people
protected? An indication is contained in the Congressional
Record, in which the following amazing statement appearsi
"... the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Economic Affairs, William H. Chartener, ...told the
subcommittee that he could not advise people that
their responses to a form were voluntary because
that would be 'bad psychology." He felt that the
Census Bureau had to give the citizen the Impression
his replies were required on pain of penalty."
(Congressional Record, vol. 115 » no. 18^)
(The law requires response only to the national decennial
census.
)
Concern over invasions of privacy extend far beyond
the practices of the government. An especially prominent
concern among many members of Congress is the practices
of credit bureaus j and for good reason
i
"A visit to any retail credit, bank credit, or
legal information bureau on any day of the week can
be most revealing (providing the manager doesn't
know about the visit). P irst of all, information In
your file contains every negatl"^e thing that ever
happened to you, going back to the beginning of your
credit life. The data is seldom updated, corrected,
or weeded out. It Includes not Just credit data,
such as failures to make Installment payments on time,
but also any legal actions takenaagalnst you, divorce
or offspring problem reports, newspaper clippings,
private detective Investigations, FBI or police
reports Including interviews with gossipy neighbors,
etc. "
(Sprague, Richard; "The Invasion of Privacy...")
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It Is obvious that every American needs to be concerned
about Invasions of prlvacyi this subject affects all of
us In many ways. We are called upon, almost dally, to
make decisions which will affect someone or some organization's
privacy. To avoid the problem any longer would be a
crufclal error and a failure to fulfill our obligation
to review questions that are fundamental to the foundations
of our nation. We cannot pass off this responsibility
to commissions or committees j they can only be participants
In the evaluation process. Nor caa we dismiss the problem
as a simple technological question to be remedied by the
scientists — as Emmanual R. Plore, Chief Scientist for
IBM, told Senator Longj
"...The effectiveness of all protective measures,
however sophisticated they become, will still depend
upon people. . . . Machines have no morals, no ethics
i
men have ethics and morals."
{
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B. What is Privacy?
Lack of widely accepted definition; some
Insights; four primary functions of privacy;
privacy as a biological necessity;
constraints imposed by society; constitutional
viewpoint vs. moralistic viewpoint.
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WHAT IS PRIVACY ?
One might reasonably ask what privacy Is and why
all these people are so concerned. Privacy Is not easily
defined; indeed, a widely accepted definition does not exist at
this time. However, Arthur Goldberg, former Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, provides some insight into
the complex meaning of privacy In a democracyi
"The fifth amendment privilege protects against
more than physical and psychological brutality? it
is intrinsic to the individual's right to privacy.
The dwindling of privacy has been as frequently
noted as the rise of crime. In the modem world,
we have only belatedly realized that privacy is an
increasingly scarce social resource and one that
must be vlllgently protected against the claims
of efficient social ordering."
Another; more functional definition is offered by
Congressman Gallagher in his speech before the American
Management Association!
"Privacy can be defined as the free choice by
a fBee man In disclosing to public view and public
record certain basic facts about his actions, thoughts,
and desires. It is up to the individual to make
this decision, Just as It is up to those who make the
laws to assure that this choice may be made in an
atmosphere unclouded by overt coercion or implied
threat. . . . Liberty \mder law — the connerstone of
a free America — demands that the past be a
springboard to the full expression and use of
ability and not an anchor which pulls a man down and
drowns him in youthful mistakes or unevaluated
early decisions."
(Gallagher, March 8, I968)
These are thoughtful men attempting to determine the
true meaning of privacy In a democracy. This is no academic
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questlonj s. precise definition would provide a^vmeans by
which many questions could be viewed — a moral and
philosophical guideline for determining policy and action.
It is therefore clear that an additional expenditure of time
to further define privacy is well Justified.
According to Professor Westln, a democratic society
uses publicity as a method for controlling the government
and for protecting individuals and groups within the
society. He claims that privacy performs four primary
functionsi
1. Individuals have an intrinsic need for personal
autonomy. Privacy provides the conduit through which
persons are able to feel that, by the control of information
concerning themselves, they havd some control over the
course of their personal lives. Thus privacy induces
independence and diversity of thought.
2. Privacy provides an emotional release; people
need to be able to express anger and frustration and to
be protected against the ramifications of the publicity
of their actions.
3. Privacy provides for self evaluation and introspection,
^. Privacy allows for the protected and privileged
vransfer of information. It allows one to discuss
Bsontroverslal subjects with fellow employees without the
fear of dismissal.
Privacy may very well be a biological necessity.
Professor VJestin goes on to say that studies of animal
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behavlor indicate that men and animals may very well share
basic mechanisms for seeking privacy within their environment.
Writing in Think Magazine, Westln discusses this possibility!
"Ecological studies have demonstrated that
animals also have minimum needs for private space
without which the animal's survival will be
jeopardized. Since overpopulation can impede the
animal's ability to smell, court, or be free from
constant defense reactions, such a condition upsets
the social organization of the animal group. The
animals may then kill each other to reduce the
crowding, or they may engage in mass suicidal
reductions of the population, as lemmings do."
(Westln, Think . May-June, I969)
Given that man is a much more complex animal, one
might extrapolate that privacy is an even more significant
determinant of behavior in the human species. Indeed,
many studies (including those by Margaret Mead) demonstrate
that Individuals in primitive as well as modem societies
go to great lengths to develop personal privacy for themselves,
Each individual decides upon the degree of privacy
he desires. The constraints of institutionalized invasions
of privacy limit, to a certain extent, the type and quantity
of privacy that he can select, for example, a person
may decide to apply for a credit card. This decision maans
that, although he may not approve of the invasion of his
privacy, the agency with whom he applied for credit will
find out his salary, his bank account balances, his real
estate ownorshlp, his marital status, and considerable other
Information about his private life. Thus, although he
might Initially have chosen to live with a great degree of
privacy, the demands of the economic activity wath which he
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has become Involved have severely limited 'ils privacy.
However, privacy Is more than a credit Investigation
or Job references; It is also tha degree to which one's
friends 'honor the confidentiality of a conversation. It
is the conversations which may be monitored by the telephone
company (as was done In Washington, D.C.).
Thus it can be concluded that privacy can be viewed
from both moralistic and constitutional viewpolntsi
the moralistic viewpoint includes the individual's personal
actions and beliefs as they relate to privacy; the constitutional
aspect is that degree of invasion of privacy which our
governmental process considers permissible. In the
absence of explicit legal evidence, the quality and nature
of national moral attitudes will determiae the extent
to which we violate each othser's privacy. The extent of
current legal protection. Including the complex questions
of constitutional law, will be examined in subsequent
sections; the current moral situation in the U. S. has
been Implicitly discussed above, but in the final analysis
is left to the determination of each individual in our
society.
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C. Privacy and the Law
Some legal prlnclplesi the Constitution; the
First Amendment; the Fourth Amendment; the
IBlfth and Fourteenth Amendments; credit bureaus;
Use of the Courts: difficulties In bringing
and winning suit; inherent limitations of the
legal system; The Chilling Effect.
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PRIVACY AND THE LAW
SOME LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Justice Douglas has said that "the right of privacy
Is older than the Bill of Rights".^ The Constitution of
the U. S. makes no mention of privacy because the government
at that time was far more limited j the problem was having
too little information rather than having too much. But
as Professor Reich of Yale saysi
•'If you read the Constitution in every way
in which they understood privacy then» they protected
it (privacy) in the Constitution.
"They protected speech and expressions and
beliefs, and those it seems to me are illustrations
of privacy. They protected religion and conscience,
each individual's to be his own.
"They protected against being forced to Incriminate
themselves by any official body. That is all the
invasions of privacy that they knew of in their tlme."^
This is a general problem In U. S. law. Chief Justice
Taney stated in Dred Scott vs. Sanford that
"The Constitution must be construed now as
it was understood at the time of its adoption. "3
Nowadays this trend has changed, and Chief Justice Douglas
has suggested that the Constitution is
"...intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently adapted to the various crises in human
affairs.^
1. 381 U.S. at ^86.
2. Reich, Charles A. ,• statement before Gallagher's
committee, 1966.
3. 60 U.S. ( 19 How.) 393 (1856).
i«-. WcCulloch vs. Maryland, 1? U.S. {k Wheat) 31 6.
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In 1965, in Grlswold vs. Conn., the Supreme Court
announced the discovery of a new constitut .onal right to
privacy. Justice Douglas asserted that
"The right to privacy Is a right Implicit
In a free society? a notion of privacy Is not
drawn from the blue. It emanates from the totality
of the constitutional scheme vmder which we live."*
The Grlswold case was an attempt to protect the right of
privacy In sexual life, which was not recognized by a
Connecticut law which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense. The law was finally ruled unconstitutional.
The First Amendment has been used extensively and publicly
by organizations such as the NAACP to claim privacy of
assoclatlonal life. But In the case of Local 309 vs.
Gates, the court has held that two conditions must obtain
If an Invasion of assoclatlonal privacy is to be proved:
"...the actual tnfeeBfleBence (by the state police
when they took notes) and the absence of any right
to be in the private meeting."'
Neither of these conditions alone is siifflclent — the
injxmction was not granted simply on account of surveillance.
The same case was referred to by the Supreme Court of New
J arsey when it held
"...that the power of surveillance is imperative.""
Another interesting strand of possible rights to privacy
erislng out of the P lEst Amendment Is that of a "right to
5. 367 U.S. 517.
6. NAACP vs. Alabama 357 U.S. l^kS (1958).
7. Local 309 vs. Gates 751* Supp. 620 (N L Ind 19^'8)
8. Anderson vs. Sills 56 N J 210 (1970).
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sllence." But efforts to press toward Judicial recognition
have so far been in vain, since the recognition of such
a right would nullify the requirements made of compulsory
witnesses.
The witness has a right, however, to avoid self-incrimination,
which is granted by the fdUPth Amendment. It safeguards not
only his privacy, but also that of his family and friends.
Brandeis noted that to protect the right to be let alone,
"Every unjustifiable intrusion by the government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment." 9
It would seem to follow that a broad right to privacy
is at least equally Inferable from the guarantee of "liberty."
In the Grlswold case. Justices Harlan and White had no
difficulty in broadening the guarantee of liberty given by
the I if th and P ourteenth Amendments in ojfder to hold marital
privacy to be one aspect of the liberty protected against
state action. The enactment violated values "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." If "liberty" or the
"concept of ordered liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment
permits the protection of privacy in general without reference
to specific provisdions of the Bill of Rights, then it would
seem even more logical to ascribe these same meanings to the
r..^rd 'liberty" in the Fifth Amendment. The right to privacy
would thus gain independent existence, and would become
a concept capable of almost limitless Judicial f orni.ulation.
9. 277 U.S. at ^78
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The right of privacy is also protected by the ripht
not to be defamed. The Supreme Court, caalms Professor
Reich,
"...has recently been extraordinarily scrupulouB
with respect to the right to have a lawyer and the
right to confront,"
This could apply directly to
"...instances of condemnation without trial,
of information supplied without confrontation, and
of a denial to the individual of any chance whatever
to answer. " '-'-'
One very important problem in terms of privacy Is
the issue of credit bureaus; unfortunately, an Oklahoma
Statutfe^- is the only legislation, state or federal, which
specifically addresses this problem. It concentrates on
the issue of access, and makes the provision that a copy
of every report should first be mailed to the person about
whom it is written. Usually the credit bureau report is
conditionally privileged, as recognized by many courts
i
"Thus in the absence of malice, the subject
of the report has no cause of action against the^gredH
bureau, regardless of the falsity of the report.
The basis of this privilege is that the credit bureau Is
performing a necessary and ^.useful business which benefits
those who have a legitimate Interest in the reporti3 Such a
privilege is not recognized in England} we doubt Its
castitutlonality here.
10, Reich, C, A., Gallagher's hearings, I966,
11, Congress, U,S. "Privacy and the National Data Bank Concept."
12. Wetherby vs. Retail Credit Go. 235 Md 237,
201 A2d 3^-^ (1963) .
13. Georgetown Law Journal, v,57, no. 3, feb. I969.
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USE 0> THE COURTS
Any U.S. citizen who feels that a law Is unconstitutional
may attack It before the Supreme Court, Such attacks have
been successful In the Grlswold ease, and have b«en linked
to the change since 1937 in the general view of the role
of the Supreme Qourt.
The federal courfes may not be used
"...as a forum in which to air the general
complaints about the conduct of go1z>erHunent or the
allocation of power In the federal system. "^^
Thusj a single citizen may have great difficulty bringing
his grievance against a federal or state agency to court.
However, he may rely on the statement thatt
"...allegations of serious and substantial
constitutional violations by government activity
present a conflict susceptible of judicial resolution."^
But there must be sufficient evidence to render credibility
to the allegations. •'° There is a very definite problem
for the plantiffs in establishing sufficient evidence.
Before the courts will accept a case, the plaintiff-
has to provid^according to 28 U.S.C. 1331) that his civil
action involves controversy in an amount of over $10,000.^''
The plaintiff must have Justiciability; that is, he has to
demonstrate that the following are Judicially identif iableV
1^+. Plast vs. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
15. Stamler vs. Willis ^15 F 2d 1365 (7th Cir. I969).
16. National Student Assoc, vs. Hershey, '4.12 F 2d II03
(1969).
17. Glancana vs. Hoover 322 F 2d 7^9 (9th Cir I963)
.
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a right In the pledntlffs, a duty of the defendants, a
breach of that duty, and a remedy within t.ie power of the
court. "A right In the plaintiffs" and "a duty of the
defendants" both give way to the same problem of the
availability of judlcAAl proof and evidence. The "breach
of duty" Is even more difficult to p»ove. As the plaintiffs
of Arlo Tatiim vs. Melvln Laird said,
"There Is a threat of unicnown surveillance,
unknown purpose, and unknown future use of the
Information gathered and recorded. "1°
How can you bring evidence of the unknown?
The defendant will often claim that
"...the basic approach must beethat the
executive branch may gather whatever information
it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable
It to perform the police roles, directional and
preventive. "19
But the problem with this, as Professor Reich says,
is that Ife is easy to tell what informat4on would be
useful, but it is not easy to feftll what is necessary. ^^
This is yet another obstacle to proof of "breach of duty."
The plaintiffs also have to prove that the remedy
is within the power of the court. In dealing with the
executive branch, the plaintiff r\ins head on into the doctrine
of separation of powers — the case itself may be unconfetltutlonal,
18. U.S.C. no 2^2203.
19. Anderson vs. Sills, N. J. Supreme Court, June 2, 1970.
20. Reich, C. A., Gallagher's hearings, 1966.
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It therefore proves very difficult — If not Impossible —
for the private citizen to win in court on the grounds
of Invasion of privacy.
ProiQ 6 practical standpoint, this state of affairs is
beneficial to the legal systemt it is doubtful that the
Justice Department would be prepared to handle the number
of cases which would arise ifi such technical barriers did
not exist. A trend toward elimination of such barriers
is becoming evidenced in the lower courts (as in Anderson vs.
Sills), but these decisions are still being reversed by
the higher courts.
If in fact the plaintiff is able to overcome all these
obstacles and present his judicial evidence, he will be
suprised to learn how the Consent Placebo is used by the
courts I the plaintiff will be assumed to have consented
"...to the dissemination of personal information
or waived his right to protest by engaging in activity
inconsistent with a desire to maintain privacy.
Unfortxonately, the application of both of these
concepts by the courts has been somewhat Draconian. "^^
The whole ideas of "consent" and "waiver" are defined
viiJblaout reference to the context of the specific situation.
It seems rather illogical to say that a person who is in
court fighting for his right to privacy consents to abandoning
i;hat right.
Modem technology and the advance of new ideas and ideals
threaten to make our Judicial system an anachronism. Privacy
21. Killer, Arthur, KichJgan Law Review . April I969.
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Is not a problem which the court system is technically
competent to handle. Indeed, the law itself seems unable
to handle problems based on non-concrete concepts — how
do you place a dollar value on an individual's right to
privacy so that you can decide whether it is worth more
than ,i;i 0,000?
THS CHILLING EFIECT
The value of the right to privacy Includes more than
the amoTint of money a person lost through being denied
a Job or credit for invalid reasons; it includes the
social cost of the erosion of the civil liberties which
are the fabric of democracy. The chilling effect on
civil liberties is not an Imaginary problem; it Is an
important threat to our society. As Justice Robert Mathews
of the New Jersey Supreme Court has said:
"Information gathering can have a chilling
effect on anyone advocating social and political
change because of involving his wife, his family,
or his employer. "22
The chilling effect doctrine — based on the First
Amendment — began in 19^7. Some civil servants attacked
one of the Hatch Act's provisions} -wader which they had
been threatened with dismissal from employment. The
court ruled that
"...the general threat of possible interference
with those appellants' rights by the Civil Service
Commission under its... rules does not make a
Justiciable case or controversy. A hypothetical
threat is not enough." ^
22. Anderson vs. Sills 56 N.J. 210 (1970).
23. United Public Workers vs. I-iitchell 330 U.S. 75 (19^7)
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But in 1965 the court recognized "the chilling effect on
the free expression of prosecutions initiated and threatened . "2^
Conversely, in I968, the court refused to enjoin the
enforcement of an anti-picketing law and saidt
"Any chilling effect on the picketing as a
form of protest and expression that flows from the
good faith enforcement of this valid statute would
not of course constitute that enforcement an
impermissible invasion of pirotected freedoms. "25
The chilling effect doctrine was most significantly
stated in 1969.^ The Hershey directive called for the
reclassification of war protesters as a result of their
exercise of the right of freedom of expression. In view
of the obvious effect that the policy would have on yo\ing
men who might otherwise voice dissent, the Supreme Court
held that the policy was contrary to law. The guidelines
by which a given chilling effect may be ruled unconstitutional
are:
"1) The severity and scope of the alleged
chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms.
"2) The likelihood of other opportunities to
vindicate such !• irst Amendment rights as may be
infringed with reasonable promptness.
"3) The nature of the issues which a full
adjudication on the merits must resolve and the
need for factual referents in order properly
to define and narrow the issues.
"These issues become relevant of course only
If the plaintiff plausibly allege that they are in
fact vulnerable to the alleged chilling effect. "^7
2k. 380 U.S. at 48? Dombrovski vs. Pflster.
25. Cameron vs. Johnson 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
26. National Student Association vs. Hershey, ^12 3 d2
1103.
27. ^12 F 2d at 1115.
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Here again the problem of judlclable evidence arises
because the chilling effect Is a threat and a fear of the
unknovm. Once again the enforcement of a law on privacy
is prevented.
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D. How privacy is Invaded.
Asking questions; readily available public
sources; complete physical and psychological
surveillance.
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HOW PRIVACY IS INVADED
The means by which privacy is violated are riTimerous
and varied; they range from unsophisticated to highly
technical methods.
The most. obvious means to obtain information from
people is to ask them questions. Surprisingly, very few
people refuse to ansv:er questions on such topics a* income,
sexual behavior, political and religious beliefs, and
educational background, if only the questions appear in
some "legitimate" form (i.e. questionnaires, voter opinion
surveys, and the like)) People are equally willing to
dlTrulge information about the drinking habits and marital
behavior of their neighbors. It is clear th6t too few people
question the validity or necessity of the process requesting
information from them before discussing their personal affairs,
Simple questioning without coerslon or pretext is the major
meems by which Invasion of privacy occurs.
A second technique for obtaining information, which
entails a greater degree of risk in some Instances, is to
search readily available information such as town records and
published informatdion including books, newspapers, and
'unofficial reports of various organizations. Sometimes
information must be purchased if this technique is utilized.
For example, .the Internal Revenue Service has had a pfiillcy
of selling to anyone lists of all persons in the U.S. who own

-35-
reglstered firearms. But more often than not the Information
is available, for all intents and pnrposes, for free. The
Soviet Union, a number of years ago, desired to obtain data
that would thoroughly describe the Baltimore harbor —
information of obvious strategic importance. They were able
to purchase from the U.S. Governaueiuh, for a nominal fee,
comprehensive books detailing all the information they
vjanted and more about not only the Baltimore harbor, but
about all major eastern harbors. This saved them an estimated
two million dollars in spying efforts.
Sometimes this method of informatlnn retrieval is more
risky. Intelligence agents or the curious seeking information
at such places as universities have been known to employ
a diversionary tactic if refused access to information —
one person diverts the clerk or secretary's attention while
the other looks up the necessary information. The willingness
of people to divulge information, however, means that this
technique is usually unnecessary. In any event, the utllieation
of existing stores of information is the second major source
of data by which privacy mi^ht be invaded.
The third and less frequentljiethod of information
collection is physical and psychological surveillance. This
Involves the use of manpower and at times electronic equipment
to monitor a person's activities, conversations, associations,
and practically every other aspect of his life.
The discussion now turns to the utilization of
modem science to gather and store iflformation. First consid-
ered are a few of the many ways in which science allows
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us to covertly collect data on our fellow citizens. Then
the Impact of the electronic computer on our ability to
store, retrelve, process, and disseminate that data Is
exam Ined
.
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E. Privacy and Technology
Electronic spying devices i counter-surveillance
measures? the sellers and buyers j the computer
and Invasion of privacy; access control And
security In time-shared computer systems.
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PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
METHOES OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
In order that the reader not be permitted to think that
electronic spying Is an activity confined to James Bond
movies, presented hereto a description of the most commonly
available electi'onlc data collection devices, along with
details of who buys and sells them. This section should
be r«ad with two facts In mind. First, the data Is from
a book published In I967 (Brown, XhS. Electronic Invasion),
and technology has at this writing three additional years
of constant advance. Second, the devices discussed are ones
available to anyone who has the means to pay for them?
no mention Is made of any top secret devices. It has been
said that the National Security Agency normally uses
equipment with a technology level ten years ahead of that
available to otfeher consumers.
Electronic bugging first came to the public eye In
i960 when Henry Cabbot Lodge revealed to the United Nations
that the USSR had bugged the great seal of the United States
In the office of the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. The
d<5Vlce consisted of a very simple resonance chamber with
an amplifier that could be Jaieked up for a few hundred feet.
Since that time considerable sophistication has been
achieved. A manager In one company who was interviewed
by Mr. Brown was reminiscing about the old days when bugs
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were blpc devices with wires and batteries which put out
so much heat that they could not be concealed except In
very large hiding places. Moreover, the spy was lucky
If the broadcast reached the next room. On the executive's
desk was one of the company's more recent dJevlces. It
was less than an Inch In all dimensions, and was designed
to be Implanted in a chimpanzee for the purpose of sending
data on weightlessness back from a satellite.
By far the most common exercise is to bug a suspect's
telephone. The classic picture is that of two bored
det^etlves in a small room listening to a set of earphones
for hours in case someone makes a call. Today, however,
the bugs transmit directly to tape recorders, and they
turn themselves off and on when calls are made. The
broadcasting portion of the automatic bugs is available
at a cost of 50^ and up.
Of course, an ideal phone tap would be one that can
not be identified as a tap even if foundip that picks up
both sides of a conversation, and that requires no direct
dbnaection to the telephone. In fact. Consolidated Acoustics
sells this device, disguised as a diary, for #59-50. It
must be within three to four feet of the telephone
(in a desk drawer for instance), and Kill broadcast over
a range of two city blocks.
YoT the unsophisticated tapper, the carbon button
Inside the speaker of the phone may be replaced with an
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Iddntlcal (but bugged) copy. Installation requires less
thaili ten seconds, and the telephone compan/ has been
baffled for considerable periods before detecting It.
It costs $24^.50 from Micro Communications Corporatlnn,
but Trl-tron sells It for |l69.95.
If replacing the butt4n Is still too much work,
Continental Telephone sells a pre-bugged phone complete
for :$250. It Is available In touch-tone and colors.
All of these devices suffer from limited broadcast
range. Therefore, the best -phone bug of all is the
Harmonica bug, which has tmlimlted range. The harmonica
bug is available from Miles Wireless Intercom, Ltd, for
$700 or from hmaanuel Mittleman of New York for $^00, and
It must be installed Inside sthe telephone. In addit46n,
the tapper must be prepared to purchase a Holner key of C
harmonica (about ^4-5^ at the five and dime). He then goes
to a phone from which he wished to tap and dials the number
of !ihe bugged phone. Blowing a specific note on the
harmonica activates the bug, which turns off the bell on
the victim's phone, connects his receiver, and amplifies
the pickup so that any conversatlnn in the room is audible.
The bug disconnects in the event that the victim picks up
tae penelver to dial out. The same device can be had from
'Continental Telephone, with an oscillator substituted for
the harmonica, for ^1000.
However, efficient eavesdropping requires the ability
to do moBe than bug telephones. Next considered are mikes
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and miniature amplifiers.
The most popular of these* in the movies, » are the
sugar cube bug and the martini olive bug. The device used
Is actually smaller than a sugar cube (1" x 3/^" x 1/H-")
And sells from Continental Telephone for $1-^9.95 (ask for
the Micro 00?). In reality, however, the sugar-cube-and-
ollve ploy Is very poor and Is Infrequently used. In the
first place, the deviceSs broadcast range Is only 200 feet.
Moreover, the olive looks like an olive only after a
substantial number of martlnlSp and can be disabled by
simply removing the toothpick. The sugar cube must also
have an antenna wftlch Is difficult to disguise; If It
Is suppected , victims should endeavor to accidentally
tip their v.'ater glass into the sugar bowl.
Much nicer than these are the wide range of small
mikes which are Imported by Telephone Dynamises Corporation
and Continental Telephone, These Include the buttonhole
mike and the tie mike ($15 to $39.95).
Along these same lines, but a little larger, are a
mike the size of a hearing aid for use under cappets, etc.,
which sells from Consolidated Acoustics for $2,25f and a
variety of mikes with transmitters disguised as various
eesk Implements. One of these Is even built Into
3 fountain pen, so that the spy may take nofees while he
records.
The snake mike (Continental Telephone, #119.50; Trl-tron
^37.50) consists of a flexible acoustical tube which Is
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extremely difficult to detect and may be vnrolled like
fish line through a skylight or keyhole. It Is obviously
useful only for very specialized operations.
A variety of other mikes are available in all sizes'
and shapes. At least one is available for every conceivable
operation. For a fuller discussion, the reader is referred
to Mr. Brown's book.
Moving on to bigger bugs, the next class of devices
are useful for bugging whole rooms. These Include the
spike mike (built into a spike, so that it can be nailed
into the victim's wall), and a variety of cigarette-
package sized mikes priced from $^9.50. The most exotic
of these are:
-The fountain pen bug mentioned above. It costs
1^1 79. 95 and may be charged on your Diner's Club card.
-The whisper light, a pre-bugged lamp useful for
marital cases, which is usually presented to the victim as
a gift for his bedroom (|150.
)
-The picture frame bug, available from Continental
for IJ15O. , and from Mosler Research Products for $215.
It has the advantage of being quite large, so that long-
life batteries may be installed, and is said to be quite
tastefully designed. It may be purchased either with or
without a painting.
It should be noted that a problem with room bugs is
that their batteries eventually run down. One of the cleverist
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of the bugs, therefore, Is that available *:hrough Steckier
Sales of New York. It jIs activated by volcis ortother noises
In the room, and turns Itself off when there Is nothing
to listen to In order to conserve power.
COUNTDR-^^Rfgyr^T.AjJCE MEASURES
With so many people Interested In listening In, then
there must be someone Interested in keeping them from doing
so. The market In bug detectors and disabling devices is much
less well developed; nonetheless, there exist some devices
which are useful.
The most naive method of bug detection Is to use an
PM radio and/or your television set to set up feedback
patterns for local bugs. By tuning slowly toaall available
stations, feedback can usually be obtaiaed on the appropriate
wavelength or one of its harmonics. Some bugs exist that
cannot be detected in this fashion.
Perhaps the most sophisticated device is a beep light,
available from Dee Company for ^195 to $295' This device
can be set to signal whenever radio transmission is
occurring nearby, and can therefore be constantly on guard
above your office door.
for those Hho would rather defeat the bugs than find
,hem, a variety of scrambling devices are available ($550
and up) for telephone conversations, and a number of Jamming
devices may be had to foil other bugs. The Jammers have
the unfortunate side effect of ruining your television
and radio transmission, however, and at one time were so
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powerful as to Interfere with communications of airplanes
flying overhead.
THE SELLERS AliJ) BUYERS
It should be clear that this meo'ket is widely'' developed
because of a great demand for such products. Mr. Brown
lists some seventy-one companies which are involved in
the bug market to y greater or lesser degree; :it is not
instructive to describe them in detail here. Hoj'ever,
a brief look might be given to some of the buyers. The
government buyers include the IRS, NASA, the Atomic Energy
Commission, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Narcotics, PDA,
General Services Administration, the U.S. Information
r.gency, the Secret Sejrvice, and the Treasury School,
Moreover, eveiy army Intelligence unit is capable of wire-
tapping, although our findings Indicate that they leave
such tasks to the local police and FBI, who specialize
in such things.
Industry buyers include Alabama Sas Corporation,
American Airlines, Avis, Boston Gas, Chrysler, Coca Cola,
Encyclopedia Americana, Hertz, Philco, Prudential Insurance,
and V/alt Disney Productions.
Indeed, Industrial espionage is ai least as big a
ousiness as government domestic espionage. A study
performed by Saber Laboratories, which specializes in
anti-bug devices, reaches the following conclusions with
regard to industrial espidmage:
-It takes place where there is high competition.
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The threat In the automobile Industry le 100/S.
-Its goal is the same as foreign espionage.
-Its tools are also the same,-- booze, broads,
blackmail, bribes, and bugs,
-Annual losses due to industrial espionage were
conservatively estimated (196?) to be three billion dollars.
-Only six percent of non-defenee Industries are capable
of detecting espionage.
-Only five percent of law enforcement officials are
capable of detecting industrial espionage.
It is hoped that these facts sufficiently alert the
reader to the latest methods for collection of data on
individuals and groups without their knowledge. The
discussion now turns to the most powerful device yet Invented
for processing that data -- the electronic computer.
THE COMPUTER MP IMYASION OF PRIVACY
It Is possible that the computer Is the most powerful
tool ever developed by man; yet it is still a tool in
exactly the same sense that the hammer is a tool. The
hammer amplifies man's ability to strike; the computer
amplifies his ability to process information. By doing so,
the computer can be made to amplify man's ability to think.
3ut tool^ are amoral objects. There is nothing
inherent in a hammer to force it to hit nails rather than
another man's head. In the same way, the computer Is amoral.
It is only one kind of amplifier for man's ability to do
good or evil. Our concern should be greater, however, for
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the computer than for the ha.rimer because of the greater
magnitude of the computer's amplifying pov/er. As
Congressman Gallagher put It:
"...It would probably take all the people
In America working 10 hours a day, five days a
week, to duplicate the output of government
computers.
"Yet, It must aiso be remembered that 100
clerks working around the clock for 100 years
may not be able to make the number of mlf-takes
a oomouter can make in 1 minute."
(Gallagher, May 7, 1968)
The computer does not Invade our privacy; it orly takes
the information given it and does what it is told to do.
Men Invade our privacy. However, the power inherent in
the computer to propagate that invasion of privacy
staggers the mind. Some examples of currently existing
technology serve to demonstrate that power.
First, in termc of processing speed, consider the
IBM 360/195. It is capable of performing on the order
of twenty-five million calculations per second.
Second, in terms of storage capacity for information,
consider the mass storage unit now marketed by Precision
Instrument Company of Palo Alto California:
"This system uses a one-watt, continuous-wave
argon laser to burn minute "pits" in the opaque
coating of plastic computjr tape. The laser is so
precise. .. that each pit is only one micron, or
.000039 inch in size. '.fJiere normal recording has
been about 560O bits of information on an inch of
ma^snetic tape, the new laser process can put
645,000,000 bits in microscopic parallel rows on
each inch. And the recording process achieves speeds
of 12.000,000 bits per second.
...In Lerms of a doL^sier society, the laser
memory system means that a single 4800-foot real
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of one-inch tape could contain about 20 double-
spaced typed pages of data on every person in the
United States — man, woman, and child. It would
take only four minutes to retrifeve a person's
dossier under such a system."
(Congressional Record, Apr. 25, 1968, p. E3359).
Lastly, consider the computer's ability to communicate
its information to nan. Line printers are commonly used
tf.at output at the rate of 1000 lines per minute. Since
this is extremely slow with respect to processing time,
a single computer will often run many of these printers
simultaneously. For those who consider this rate still
too slow, a variety of other devices, such as a direct
microfilm printer, are available. Moreover, the idea
of the computer for everyman, with terminals in each home,
is not far removed from the realm of possibility; a number
of firms now sell typewriter-like terminals that may be
attached directly to the standard home telephone. They
can communicate with any computer in Ma Bell's domain.
Perhaps the greatest public concern has been caused
by the advent of multiple-access time sharing systems, in
which a rather large number of users are utilizing one
coipputer simultaneously. It is indeed clear that these
systems present a much greater threat to privacy than even
the batch systems of past years. Problems of controlling
access to liiformation stored on-line are greatly complicated
when forty persons are using the same physical devices at
the same time. However, time- sharing hardware and software
also present much better opportunities for access control than
conventional systems. The technology for protection currently
exists, although it is not commonly used In business or government,
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ACC5SS CQHTROL AlJD SECURITY IN TIME-SHARED COMPUTERS
The first problem is identification of the user
at his terminal. Since the terminals are remote from
the computer itself, it is much more difficult to find
out if the user is who he says he is. The only commonly
used method of identification is the password, and
commercial and sovernment systems vary greatly in the
sophistication of their password schemes. In any case,
the user is required to supply a more-or-less secret password
at the time he logs in. Some of the problems with such
a scheme are obvious. Aside from the possibility of
coersion of a user to obtain his password, there is the
possibility that someone will obtain access to the entire
system password file, either through electronic means or
hj bribinp- system operators. Therefore, a number of
other sohemes have been proposed, ranging from fingerprints
to signatures. Most of these schemes are technically
feasible; however, they fail to realize that any identification
must be transformed to a bit pattern for transmission to
the .;omputer. Ko matter how complex the identification
technique, the user's i.d. can be had for the trouble of
tapping the line and recording that bit pattern.
What is needed, therelore, is an identification scheme
that varies dynamically over time. Such a scheme, now
in use by the Project MAC Advanced
Interactive Management System (MacAIMS) at M.I.T, is the
procedural password. In this method of identification, the
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computer prompts the user with a string of random digits
(different at each T«g-ln ). The user then performs a simple
calculation (the procedure) on the digits and returns an
answer, which may be arbitrarily disguised, based on that
calculation. The correctness of this answer determines
whether access is permitted. Thus, since the prompting
number is different each time, the password is also different.
Bach user, of course, has a different procedure for obtaining
the answer. Unfortunately, it could be coereed from him.
The next problem is that of tapping of communications
lines between the computer and the terminal. All major
time sharing systems in use today transmit over standard
telephone company lines. There is no way that thextftpplng
of such lines can be prohibited. Howevert, it is possible
to construct lines which are arbitrarily difficult to tap
without being detected. Unfortunately, the telephone compsuay
has no thought of ripping out all their currently existing
lines to replace them with more expensive ones. Moreover,
the cost of running special lines for an individual system
is almost always prohibitive.
The only solution for transmission security that is
practical today, therefore, is the encoding of the informaition
transmitted. It is clear that coding schemes of arbitrary
complexity can be thought up and changed at will. The cost
of such schemes in terms of reduced processing speed caused
by the necessity of coding and decoding each piece of data,
and in terms of the necessity to have decoding logic built
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into each terminal Is so great that encoding schemes
are not commonly used.
Once inside the computer, the access control problems
are those of deciding how to store Information in such
a way that willful or accidental misuse of the data may
be prevented. In Multlcs (The Multiplexed Information and
Computing Service of Project MACOat M.I.T.), for example, each
user has the ability to store his data in separate units
called segments, and to specify who may (or may not) have
access to each of those segments. A variety of access modes
(i.e. access to read, to write only, to append, etc.) are
provided, and the user may change the access control lists
of his information at will. Every attempt to access a
segment is checked against the access control lists before
access is permitted. Thus the access control lists may
be used to prevent unwanted invasions of the stD»age
system.
Multics has also implemented a ring structure for
protection, which may be viewed as a niunber of concentric
rings of privilege. The operating system decides in which
ring a particular program may execute, and any program which
tries to reference an Inner ring will be trapped by the
supervisor. Thus at the time any access to a more privileged
ring is attempted, the programs in that privileged ring have
the option of deciding whether to permit access. Thus "access"
does not mean unlimited privileges — access to a user's data
may be completely under the control of hiscpirti programs.
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A related problem which Is being studied In detail
at MacAIMS Is the question of how to decide who may
have access to output Information which has been aggregated
from Input Information with specific access characteristics.
Solutions to this problem should be forthcoming In the
near future.
Thus, as the Multlcs example show, a large variety
of technical solutions to access control problems are
currently available. However, these solutions are not
widely Implemented in any area except the academic environment
of M.I.T. It Is Implicit In the above statements that one
reason for this lack of use of protection schemes is the
cost Involved. Multlcs and other systems have shown, however^
that the cost of protection Is not prohibitive. But since
the builders of comr)uter systems are almost never the same
group as those whose privacy is threatened In a direct manner by
the system, the Incentive to incur that cost is very low. In
fact, in many cases the incentive is quite negative. Consider
for a moment the size of the power gap that may exist between
the controllers of information and the people to whom the
information pertains. The truism that private knowledge is
power is Indeed quite strue. An unfortvmafee fact of human
natuBB is that there are very few people who, having once
experienced power, prefer having less of It sto having more.
However, the main reason for the wide-spread lack of
adequate protection is probably that the state of the art In
computer science in areas outside the academic sphere is far
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less advanced than the examples discussed. Many, If not inost,
of the computer users In government and Irduatry are still
trying to get their machines to process data at all. They
have not yet reached the point of trying to process data well.
Moreover, many computer manufacturers also lack the necessary
sophistication — for example, the IBM System 36O lacks the
hardware to inhibit reading.
In the final analysis, then, computers need not be the
problem. It is much easier to set up a system for access
control in a centralized computer file than in decentralized
hand operated systems. Computerized access control, however,
depends very heavily on the availability of honest and very
competent programmers. The implementation of a system like
Multics requires a tremendous effort.
Centrallzatirm of information in a computer makes many
operations cost-effective that would otherwise be unreasonably
expensive. Unfortunately, the fact that the access system
becomes centralized also makes concentrated efforts to break the
access controls cost-effective. GentraliZBtion of sensitive
information can therefore be expected to cause an increase
in determined attacks on the access control mechanisms, and
any decision to centralize informiation must take account of
this increase. The security of 4he access control system
becomes a very important issue.
Ultimately, the implementation of proper secirrity measures
in computer systems is the responsibility of the systems
designers. A variety of measures may be taken to protect
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against the System Administrators. One might, for example,
partition the system development effort Ir such a way that
no single person would know enough to violate privacy measures.
One mlfrht require certain decisions to be made by groups of
people rather than by one Individual. One might have extensive
auditing procedures analogous to those used In accounting
prac:blce today. Essentially none of these measures are In
use feoday.
Not all of the technical difficulties related to protection
have been solved; however, the technical capabilities to
make the computer an amoral tool to a large extent exist
today; It Is the human problems upon which we need to
concentrate most. There can be no question but that our
privacy is threatened virtually every day. The advanced
state of our technology combined with the willingness of
citizens to divulge information bbout almost any individual
can be obtained if one Is willing to make an effort to do
so. Unfortunately, very few safeguards exist to regulate
either who collects Inforaation or how. And many people
are willing to make a considerable effort to collect information
on all of us, sometimes for very valid reasons, occasionally
for not so valid reasons.
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An Initial solution and Its shortcomings
Allowing Individuals access to their own
files? reasons this is over- simplistic
j
conflicts of privacy J first cut at a
reasonable solution.
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Ah INITIAL SOLUTION ANL ITS SHORTCOMINGS
Today the most commonly proposed solution to issues of
invasion of privacy is simply to allow Individuals access to
their own files in order that they might correct any Information
which Is erroneous. This proposal is over-simplistic on
several countsi
Pirst, it assumes that the individual is the only entity
which might ever be Inarmed by invasions of prdivacy. This is,
of course, not the case. Even now there are many groups who
have been harmed by the illegitimate release of information
about them — large corporations, draft-resistance groups,
political groups, and the government Itself. These groups
presumably have some right to privacy, although Constitutional
guarantees are even less well defined than for individuals,
and should be given consideration. It is true, however, that
the individual remains the most Important of these entities in
terms of privacy Issues.
Second, Individual access" assumes that the individual
Is the most qualified person to correct his own record, and
that he will be Interested in having his file correct. Again,
this ^s in many cases false. It is ridiculous to think, for
example, that a nerson should be able to change his medical
record at will; surely we cannot all be physicians. Also,
in the case of information which in some way imfavorable,
(which is the only information Involved in this controversy).
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it will never be In the individual's interest to have correct
information in his file. If we do not trust a small group of
people to accurately report sensitive information, then we surely
do not want to have to trust everyone to perform the same
function.
However, the most Importaiub shortcoming of this method of
quality control is that it does not recognize the problem of
with
conflicts of privacy. Most, if not all, of the data/whlch/we
are concerned is the joint property of at least two parties —
the person who originated the information, and the person who
the data is about. In many cases, the privacy rights of these
two individuals are In conflict. Consider, for example, the
case of medical records. Included in these records are many
Impressions that the doctor might note down to aid himself in
future work with the patient. For example, it might be very
Importanii to remember that a patient shows signs of schizophrenia.
However, the doctor would clearly not want the patient to be
aware that this opinion vias contained in his medical record
.
Thus, to release the medical record to the patient would conflict
with the doctor's right to privacy.
The first cut at a solution to the problem of conflicts
'jT privacy might be to draw a very clear distinction between
information which is to be considered fact, and that which is
to be considered opinion. In the medical example, it would be
possible to serrate the facts from the doctor's opinions,
giving patients access to the former record but not the latter.
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Unfortunately, this distinction between verified fact and
heresay opinion is not dravm in many of the important col-
lections of information in use at this time. Moreover, even
if It were drawn today, there still would remain a number of
true conflicts of privacy which require other methods of
resolution.
Thus allowing individuals access to information about
tiens is not an acceptable solution to all questions of invasion
of privacy. It is a simplified solution which is, in the final
analysis, only applicable to simple cases.
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G. The case in favor of data banks
Three main forces driving the collection
and dissemination of information; common
abuses.
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TH Ji G&Sa Hi fAVOR OF DATA BLANKS
All of this, of course, Is not to Imply that society-
has no right to collect and disslminate information regarding
Individual members of groups of members. Indeed, one of the
few characteristics that sets us apart from the lower
animals is our ability to record and transmit information
from generation to generation by other than genetic means.
It would be ridiculouB to even consider attempting to run a
society without suchiinf ormation. The question, then, becomes:
what limit is to be placed on such collection?
Logically, there are three main forces which drive man
to collect data and disslminate information. The first, and
perhaps most prone to abuse, is to facilitate the management
function of the society. In order to maintain what we cell
civilization, a tremendous coordinating effort is needed,
lor example, much detailed information about an individual is
necessary to simply process his paycheck. It is necessary to
know his name in order to write the check, his social security
number in order to withhold taxes which he is boimd by law to
pay, his rate of pay in order to calculate the amount of the
check, etc. It is difficult to quarrel with the necessity for
J.eeplng this information.
Another example of information which is relevant to the
management function is the selective service system. Here
again, considerable personal information about individuals is
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necessary to detennine their obligations for military service.
It is easy to think of more examples.
The most common way that the necessity for collection of
data to perform the management function is abused is by over-
extension. The collection of information, as we shall see,
has a very powerful driving force inherent within itself.
Data collection systems, if left alone, will often collect data
far beyond their true needs and collection will become a goal
in itself rather than a means to a specific end.
The second driving force for data collection is to set
up systems for resolving conflicts in the rights of Indivldtial
members of the society. It is difficult to think of a right
that cannot be abused by specific individuals. Per example,
it is clear that driver's licenses are necessary in our society
to prevent dangerous, incompetent, and reckless persons from
abusing other people's rlghtsto use our roads with some measure
of safety. Another good example is the FBI fingerprint file,
which is tremendously helpful in preventing the destruction of
life and property by criminal elements.
Perhaps the most common way in which data systems set up
for resolving such conflicts are abused is that In some cases
tns resolution of a specific conflict may depend on the
relative political power of the individuals or groups Involved
in the conflict. Such systems must be cautiously constructed
to avoid the possibility of might being right.
The last major reason for the collection and d issiminatlon
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of Information is the value that information has in its ovm
right. Knowledge is power, as the saying goes. It is very
difficult to imagine that we could have progressed to our
current level of civilization without having institutioaalized
the public library.
However, In systems which are built for the purpose
of dissimlnatlon, care must be taken that information Is not
inappropriately dlsslmlnated. P'or example, the library should
not open its files of individual users' borrowing records to
examination by the general public. Moreover, it is Important
that information systems set up primarily for one of the other
two fiinctions be prevented from distributing Information for
the value of its disslminatlon; such distribution is almost
always inappropriate. Care should be taken, for example, that
Information from court probation records is not sold for mondj
or favors to proppectlve employers.
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H. Criteria for evaluation of individual data banks.
Criteria for entry into the system} quality
control of input data? outdated data; aggregation
of data into useful information? access to
information; exchange of information between
data banks; social benefits xg. social costs.
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CHITERIA lOR TOE EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL DATA BANKS
Based on the above discussions amd on the inherent
purpose of an information system — to collect raw data and
process it in some way to produce relevant analysis — it is
easy to set down the dimensions upon which any proposed data
bank should be evaluated before it is established. Unfortunately,
none of thede data banks we have investlgatedsshow significant
signs of being planned with these dimensions In mind; to the
extent that the issues have been considered at all, they have
come under study only belatedly, after someone important
(or loud) has brought theddata bank to the public eye. The
five specific dimensions that should be considered are dis-
cussed below.
Of primary importance is the criteria by which some piece
of datiom concerning an individual or a group becomes qualified
for entry into the data bank. In order to establish a com-
prehensive and logical set of criteria, prior thought to the
specific goals of the system must be given. If the desired
output of the system can be stated precisely (and Justified
on the basis of the right of individuals and groups to control
their own privacy), then input criteria can be defined and
bovmded in a fashion that not only eliminates the gatherlnp;
cf useless information and promotes efficient system design,
but also prevents ill side effects of the data bank on either
the individuals with which it is directly concerned or on those
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v;ith which It is not concerned.
host of the Intelligence data banks we have Investigated
either do not have any clear cut criteria for the collection
of data or do not follow them. The rule seems to have been to
collect anything that happened to come to the attention of the
data collection portion of the system, on the chance that it
might be useful.
Once reasonable standards have been set up for determinlnp-
what data is to be sought (and accepted) as input to the system,
it is necessary to set up procedures for controlling the
quality of that information. Quality control has two aspects.
First, there is control of the accuracy of input data as it
is entering the system. In a computer system, this might
involve checking pimch cards forkkeypunchlng errors; in a
standard security check system like the Army's, it might in-
volve careful and extensive training of the collecting agents
to discern truthful answers from false ones. Moreover, it
should Involve distinct separation and labeling of "fact"
from "opinion" as discussed above. The systems we have
studied have in general failed to perform adequate bhecking
of input data J army investigators, for example, currently
receive between two hours and nine days of training in loyalty
a.:?. Judications before they are sent out to Judge secnrity
which determine whether the individuals Involved can have a
Job. Included in the nine day course 18 forty hours of
training in typing. Until recently, the practice was followed

-65-
of including with the facts collected by these agents spot
reports from field men. Spot reports are verbal reports by
an agent covering, say, a demonstration which range from two
or three words to a short paragraph, and are not verified at
all.
The second aspect of quality control concerns the removal
of Information from the file when it becomes outdated. Until
the recent public outcry, none of the data banks investigated
ever removed any Information of any kind or quality from their
files. Today the army has a standing order to destroy spot
reports within 60 days after the end of the situation to which
they refer. There are a number of exceptions by which such
reports may be aaintained past this period, and we have not
verified the extent to which the standing order is followed
at the local level.
The next important consideration is the methodology jused
for aggregating all of this raw data into useful information.
The collection of data by Itself produces very little in the
way of predictive Information? relevant portions of the data
must be combined and ' analysed by more or less sophisticated
techniques. Many of the failures of prediction of current
data systems result from a lack of understanding of this very
basic difference between data and information; data are the
building blocks from which information is obtained.
Given a system which is able to provide useful information,
it is necessary to very carefully control access to that
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Information. Access control Is a necessity that goes far
beyond Intelligence files; virtually every piece of information
that is useful is sensitive to a greater o* lesser degree, and
must therefore be protected. Very specific rules for the
dispersal of information from a system must be set up. These
rules must consider both the authority and the need to know of
the potential receiver of the information. Such rules are,
of course easy to conceive. Seeing that they are followeri la
quite another matter. Codes can be broken, employees can be
bribed, and any number of more or less covert techniques
applied in order to circumvent rules which have been established
Thus, access control must include mechanisms for determining
when access rules have been violated — this is the issue of
security. The most simple-minded security measure (simple
because it is also very susceptible to violation) Is the
audit trail.
A sub-problem of access control is exchange of information
(or data) between data banks. Not only must care be taken to
Insure that such exchanges are appropriate in terms of the
rights of the individuals or groups to which the information
pertains, but also greater scrutiny than ever is required to
"^ srify the accuracy of Information obtained in such an exchange.
One argument for preventing or minimizing the exchange of
information between systems is the hope that by maintaining
separate systems, the biases associated with each collection
and analysis scheme will cancel eath other out, and thus pro-
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vide the decision-maker with a more balanced picture of the
real situation.
Last and most important, consideration must be given to
the social effects of the proposed information system. Bach
function that the system is to perform must be weighed in terms
of its social benefits and social costs. The benefits may be
delineated in terms of the driving force behind the system's
establishment — will the system in fact assist in the manage-
ment function of the society; or will it help resolve conflicts
of indivldxial's rights; or will it cause progress through the
distribution of knowledge?
These benefits must be balanced againsttthe social costs
of the system, which may be measured in terms of the individual's
loss of privacy, the resulting degradation of freedom and the
possible chilling effect on the exercise of civil liberties.

-68-
PAHT III: THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITYi
ITS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON LAWFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
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A. Justification for political intelligence files
and their inconsistencies.
Deterrent power; apprehension of criminals;
necessity for preparedness; public nature of
public actions; nothing to hide; shortcomings
of these arguments.
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JUSTIPIOATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
FILES AND THEIR INCONSISTXBSISS
We now turn to an examination of the most prominent
justifications given for the maintenance of intelligence
files on dissidents engaged in lawful activity. It should
be noted that, in this context, Justiflcatione are differ*
ent from reasons for establishment. Our research reveals
no substantial attempts to Justify the creation of such
files to proper authorities (i.e., authorities at the ap-
propriate levels to make policy Judgments concerning the
right of the American people to privacy) at the time the
files were established; these Justifications have been
brought forward only in the face of public outcry against
the files.
The first benefit cited for the maintenance of such
files is that they serve as a deterrent to would-be crimi-
nals. Presumably, such deterrent power rests on the gener-
al public's knowledge t£ daiaeffeQ41«pp«aftepdiwerful police
force, armed with the knowledge to track and apprehend
criminal offenders of all varieties. For example, Florida
Giiief of Police Bernard Garmire has said:
"It's absolutely imperative that the police do lit
(maintain files). Sir.
"...To prevent crime; to protect the rights of the
people...; it's incumbent upon the police to know what's
going on their reppective Jurisdictions....
QUESTION: So you in effect can watch anyone in
the United States at your discretion?
Garmire: I think so, yes. Sir."
(Transcript of The Advocates . Oct 2?, 1970< p. 16-17)
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However, it should be noted that very few concrete ex-
amples of the prevention of violence based on the existence
of the files have been given. Many proposed examples on
closer examination are revealed to be cases Involving known
criminals or persons engaged in clearly illegal activities.
Such cases are not to the point of the scrutiny of legal
activities. Chief Garmire proposes one case in which the
bombing of Key Biscayne by a person who had no previous
criminal record was prevented:
"We apprehended, in the city of Miami, a young
person who was actively attempting to enlist and recruit
the support of people who had technological ability in
the construction of boabs...."
(Transcript of The Advocates, p.l6.)
But the making of bombs is not a legal activity. Most ex-
amples show similar deficiencies.
Moreover, there are numerous examples where such
surveillance has not prevented violence, Pa\il Weaver, a
Harvard professor who appeared on "The Advocates" in support
of the maintenEuace of the files, has admitted:
"I don't Icnow of any evidence that surveillance
directly dsters assassins or disorderly disimptiona
or anything that Is Illegal or violent. •••"
(Transcript of The Advocates) p.
Almost any riot or violent demonstration in the last few •
years can be used as an example of a case where extensive
n:'irveillance has not prevented violence.
Professor Weaver has said in a personal interview,
however, that he considers the deterrent effect of such
files to be an unmeasurable quantity. It is Impossible,
he claims, to set up a properly controlled experiment to
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tQst whether more or fewer acts of violence would occur In
the absence of such surveillance*
The second benefit cited for the files Is that they
are an aid to the apprehension of criminals who have in the
past committed crimes* Examples are the apprehension of
Weathermen In New York and the mis-applied Florida
bombing incident reported above. We have no Intention of
disputing the value of keeping any records whatsoever on
known criminals. The question is —• and a^ain none of the
examples answer it — whether the apprehension of these
criminals was substantially aided by surveillance of activi-
ties which are legal, and moreover, whether any Information
was gained by such surveillance which could not have been
obtained as readily by more conventional means.
The files are also Justified on the basis of the neces-
sity for preparedness to handle illegal or violent activi-
ties which might evolve from legal but potentially violent
activities and demonstrations. iL4ccording to General Johnson,
former Chief of Staff of the Army, the army views itself as
the last bulwark of defense of American Society. If it xo
loses control, for example, of a Detroit-like riot, there
is no higher force to which appeal may be made. This is h
bis Justification for the Army's use of political surveil-
i€ince. The same types of arguments, with lesser degrees of
finality, are applied to operation by all state, local, and
national law enforcement agencies.
It should be noted at this point, however, that high
officials in the Justice Department have stated flatly that

-73-
raost of the information gathered is useless for the
purposes of prediction. To take an extreme example, consider
the Army's attempt to apply counterinsurgency tactics
developed for use in Southeast Asia to the Detroit riots
of 1967. Such actions imr)ly a basic misunderstanding of
the issues and the players Involved. A conspiracy to take
(or re- take) a coiAntry is certainly different from a mindless
riot.
The predictions of the J^Jtsstice Department's Intelligence
files may also be subject to question. The JdBStlce Department's
Civil Disturbance Estimate of November ^l-, I969 begins
"It is my assessment that the potential for vi-
olence with resulting personal injuries and r^osslble
deaths, as well as damage to real and personal property,
in connection with the demonstrations planned by the
New Mobilization Committee. .. Is extremely high. By
extremely high I mean the llklihood of violence, its
intensity, and extent, would be considera"B>ly beyond
the violence which was witnessed during the Pentagon
demonstration in October, 1967f the Democratic National
Convention in Chicago in August, I968, and the demonstrations
in Chicago on October l^th conducted by the Students
for a Democratic Society."
It is on the basis of such tremendously inaccurate predictions
that policy decisions concerning government reaction to protest
are made.
Another ai^giunent Aade for the harmlessness of data banks
which are limited to recording of actions at public events is
j.'iat such events are by definition public , which means
that any actions performed there are meant to be known and
are not private. However, Congressman Cornelius Gallagher
has argued that a very dangerous problem in our society is
the ability to make a man's past follow him aroiond forever.
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Speaklng of the computer's ability to remember things for-
ever, he has said:
"Errors petrifying in a computerized record may
be used to deny the adult an opportunity for which he
Is highly qualified..., Society should not penalize the
adult for his repented and redeemed sins as a child..,,
"V.,we baxL>^ program redemption out of American so-
ciety. ..once you have paid the price for a mistake, you
have the right to continue and develop your talents,
free from a constant reminder that you have once
faltered."
(Gallagher, May 7, 1968)
Closely related to this Is the last justification ~
that "I have nothing to hide." If the discussion of the
bases of privacy has not amply demonstrated the fallacy of
this idea, consider Justice Goldberg's statement:
"What is wrong with that? Simply this — that
everyone has something to hide; not something that he
Is necesseJTily ashamed of but that he wants for his
own. That he once registered as a democrat, for ex-
ample, or made an Improvident investment, or engaged
In a youthful escapade, not even criminal, or bought
an Edsel. These are the sorts of facts that the state
knows, but that we do not want it to know too well,"
All of this should not be construed to imply that data
files on political activities are inherently evil and should
not be allowed. Rather, it should indicate that the argu-
ments thusfter presented by the proponents of such files are
Inadequate at best. It is clear that society must be allowed
some mechetnisms by which to safeguard Itself from violence.
:3at it is important to realize that obtaining this pro-
tection requires certain tradeoffs, and that these tradeoffs
must be explicitly considered at the time such mechanisms
are constructed. It is abundantly clear, that such mecheuiisms
for maintaining society's norms, if left to themselves, will
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expaad fax beyond their Intended function; If we are to
maintain control of such Institutions, we must closely regu-
late them from the very beginning,
s with any Information system, the basic tradeoff to
be considered Is the extent to which Individuals In a soci-
ety choose . to sacrifice their privacy rights In the Interests
of maintaining the norms of the society at large* It Is
cleco* that society has to protect Itself against common crim-
inals, lunatics, etc. It Is our claim, however, that soci-
ety can obtain the Information It needs to protect Itself
from such people without Infringing on the privacy rights
of any except the usual known criminals and avowed subver-
sive groups. To the extent that society enforces Its norms
through violations of the Individual privacy rights of
significant numbers of Its citizens, the quality of life
In that society Is severely degraded, and Its right to con-
tinued existence Is subject to question.
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B. Survey of Existing Data Banks
Retail credit bureau; Internal Revenue;
F.B.I.
; Dept. of Justice; Secret Service;
H.E.W.; Housing and Urban Development;
Customs Bureau; Civil Seriritce; Navy; Air
Force; C.I. A.; House of Representatives
Internal Security Committee; Selective
Service System; Dept. of Immigration and
Naturalization; Dept. of State; State and
local governments; New York Stock Exchange
Drlnan.
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PARTIAI, SURVEY 0? EXISTING DATA BANKS
This section will examine different data banks,
presently In exi stance. In both the Fed era L and non-
Fed era! sectors.
THE RETAIL CREDIT BUREAU
This nationwide company is number one In the retail
credit invest iiz;at ion business. They have a total of 45
million reports on American citizens and Issue copies of
these reports together with newly created reports at the
rato of 35 m.il 1 ion per year. The price of the reports
range from
-$5 to $2 5, depending on the quality of infor-
.'aation the requesting organization desires. The Federal
Government itself requested more than 10,000 reports on
various individuals in 196?.
The company employs 6,300 trained Inspectors, of whom
approximately sixty percent have had some college education
including about 1?60 with Bachelor degrees.
The average report oroduction Is 11^ reports per day
oer inspector. These files are located In over 300 differ-
ent locations throughout the United States.
Cnly about 5 percent of the reports are believed to
contain unfavorable information. Furthermore, although an
individual may discuss his report with the company, he may
not examine its contents.
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THE UNITED STAT fiS INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
The I.R.S. has 15,000 employees including 1800
special investigative agents in the tax fraud division
and has statutory authority for the collection of Fed-
eral tax revenues. In pursuit of this objective, the
agents of the I.R.S. utilize a wide range of electronic
equioraent, a fact only recently available to the general
public. Further, the I.R.S. refuses to divulge informa-
tion about its agents and files, ostentatiously as a pro-
tection of privacy. Never the less, the Service will sell
confidential tax return information on any United States tax
payer, for ^7 5 per reel of tape, to 23 other Federal agencies, to
certain agencies of any of the states Including the District
of Columbia, and to over a dozen foreign countries. In
addition, tax return information may be seen by the heads
of a number of Federal agencies, some Congressional com-
mittees, the governors of every state, and by a Special
Counsel to the President.
According to Senator Edward V. Long, writing in Playboy ,
the Treasury Deuartment maintains a school in Washington,
D,G. yrhere agents are taught how to break and enter into
buildings and install various electronic eavesdropping equio-
raent
.
Protection of tax information is presently a contro-
versal subject. Although the I.R.S. states that information
submitted on tax returns is confidential, some local
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jurlsdict ions which had received tax data on individuals,
according to the New York Times of June 28, 1970, were merely
instructed to alert their employees that the unauthorized
disclosure of Federal tax information was punishable by a
$1000 fine. The I.R.S. apparently exerted no control over
the use of the information.
THa FEDERAL BUHEAU OF INVESTIGATION
The F.B.I, is authorized to collect data based on three
seperate statutes. In 19^0 President Roosevelt directed the
Bureau to gather domestic intellegence information re-
garding subversive activities in the United States by or-
ganizations and individuals engaged In attempts to over-
throw the Government. Second, the Federal Employee Security
Program and the Internal Security Act of 1950 authorized the
F.B.I, to gather information to be used by the Attorney
General of the United States and by the Subversive Activities
Control Board in the compilation of lists of subversive
groups. Third, the F.B.I, is authorized to investigate all
violations of Federal criminal laws Including the Federal
anti-riot law. The internal operations of the Bureau is
under the direction of the Domestic Intellegence Division.
Each year eight million people are arrested in the U.S.
and most police denartments routinely send copies of the
arrested person's fingerprints and arrest record to the Bureau,
These files presently include the records of 50 million
Americans who have, at some time, been arrested. The fingerprint
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flle alone is increasing at the rate of 30,000 files per day.
F\irther, the local police often fail to inform the F.B.I.
of the outcome of the arrest so that many files are still
retained on persons who have been cleared of all charges.
The F.B.I, is currently proposing that its computerized
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Intel legence center
in Washington become a national crime Information center to
include all national information on individuals involved, in
some way, with a criminal act and on whom there exists a file
in some police deoartment. The communication lines from this
center would extend to all police agencies in the country.
The F.B.I, is also currently engaged in an argument with
its parent agency-the Department of Justice. When the Justice
Department established Project Search, a computerized national
crime information system somewhat like the NCIC, the F.B.I,
participated in the program as an observer. However, when the
project's directors reported to the Department that any expanded
system should include the right of an individual to examine
his file, the F.B.I, subsequently advanced its own plans for a
data bank after declaring that this proposal was unacceotable
to the Bureau.
The F.B.I, has also Recently been granted authority to
release data on individuals to banks and insurance compariies,
according to Jared Stout in the October U, 1970 issue of the
Long Island Press.
The F.B.I.*s t)rinclr>al sources of domestic information
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Include publications generally available to the public,
and state and local Dolice files. Covert operations, such
as wiretaDDlng, are also engaged in. All of this data Is
usually ket)t in raw form with some reports going to other
Federal agencies.
As a matter of interest, it should be noted that 50% more
space in the new F.B.I, headquarters in Washington, D.C. has
been allocated to domestic intell i'gence than to criminal
and other intellegence operations.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
According to Jack Anderson, writing in the Washington
Post of November 28, 1970, the Justice Department now has
over 13,000 dossiers on anti-war demonstrators. Only a
dozen or so could possibly be suspected of violating any law.
Each week, the Justice Department Issues computerized infor-
mation about the potential disorders, region by region,
throughout the United States, in four books each about two
inches thick, and enclosed in brown cardboard covers. These
report on the marches, rallies, organizations, and the indivi-
duals supnorting them. Specific upcoming major events are also
studied in the s-ime way. It is interesting to note th'^t no
specific authorization was sought from Congress to set up
the Justice Dep-irtment computer files.
Since November 1969, when the Washington Moratorixiin
events occurred, the Interdivislonal Intelligence Unit of
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the Dep-rtment of Justice under the direction of James T.
Devine, has supplanted the army's Counter-intelligence
An-^.lysis Division as the Federal Agency with authority for
civil disturbance and related political intelligence opera-
tions. The unit maintains a computer system larger than the
one formerly used by the army which was ordered to be shut down.
3ECHET SERVICE
The Secret service employs one of the newest and most
sophisticated computers in the Federal Government. This
computer functions to assist the Service in carrying out
Its extensive statutory authorithy which Includes the fol-
lowing:
1. The collection of information pertaining to
a threat or attempt by an individual, group or organiza-
tion to harm or embarass anyone protected by the Secret Ser-
vice or any high government official whether he is In the
U.S. or abroad.
2. Information related to individuals, groups or
organizations who have plotted, attempted, or carried out
assassinations of high officials of this or a foreign government,
3. Information concerning the use of bodiJ.y harm
as a political weauon including training used to carry out
the act,
^. Information on persons who insist on personally
contacting high government officials for the purpose of redress
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of imaginary offenses.
5. Information on any person who makes written
or oral statements about high government officials which
are either threatening, irrational, or abusive.
6. Information on professional gate crashers.
7. Information on bombings.
8. Information on owners of firearms or other
implements of war.
9. Information on all anti-American demonstrations
in the U.S. and overseas and the collection of information
on civil disturbances regardless of the cause for the d istuan.bance,
DEP.^TMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
HEW has a data bank containing the scholastic records,
including teacher judgements, on over 300,000 children of
migrant farm workers. There is presently no statutory author-
ity over the distribution of this information.
The Social Security Administration maintains a large data
bank containing information on every American who has ever
received a Social Security number.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The Federal Housing Administration has a computerized
data banK Including the identities of 325,000 loan applicants.
HUD also has its own adverse information file on groups and
individuals and receives F.B.I, information on investigations
of housing matters for addition to this file.
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CUSTOMS BUREAU
The Customs Bureau has a computerized list of suspected
or i-noi*nasmugglei\T which can be queried from a large number
of boarder cro5;sing points throughout the U.S. Since the
system began in March of I97O with 3000 initial entries, the
file has grown over six times in size, and is continuing to
grow. Known as the Custom Automated Data Processing Intelle-
gence Network, the system is under scrutiny because it does not
allow an individua! to check the validity of the information
in his file. CADPIN was designed to be fully compatible
with other law enforcement computer systems when necessary.
The information on the file is available to other Federal,
state and J.ocai law enforcement agencies,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
The Commission maintains files on all current and former
employees of the Federal Government and conducts investigations
on all employment applicants. The Commission also maintains
a subversive activities data bank containing the n-imes of
an estimated 1.5 million citizens. This is in addition to
the employment files which contain over 10 million records.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
The Naval Intel legence Agencies maintain a large scale
file on citizens who may represent a threat to naval installations,
reportably including an intelligence file on political dissidents.
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DEP/VRTMENT 0? THE AIR FORCE
Live the Mavy, the Air Force maintains files in support
of its requirements for protecting air bases and other
installations.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The CIA hns an extensive filing system on many Americans
^Ich is located at its Langley, Virginia headquarters.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES INTERNAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
The Committee maintains a list of radical campus speakers
and had requested colleges to submit lists of speakers.
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
A decentralized system of files on every American who
has registered With the Selective Service System exists through-
out the United States. A significant feature of these files
is the right of an individual to Inspect and add to his file
at any tlnie.
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
The Department maintains a data bank containing informa-
tion about all foreign nationals in the U.S.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The State Department's Passport Office retains files on
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al I Americans who apply for U.S. passports.
3T'\TE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The State of Oklahoma maintains a secret agency directed
by a former military offlcler which has the responsibility
of collecting information on a large number of citizens and
organizations. The agency is under the control of the Okla-
homa National Guard. Individuals are not allowed to inspect
their files nor has anyone's name ever been removed from the
files.
The State of Pennsylvania is preparing to implement a
five million dollar computer based information system with
direct connection to the F.B.I.'s National Crime Information
System in Washington. Most police organizations in the State
will also be linked directly into the computer system. At
present, the system Is intended to contain information on
criminal activities and motor registrations.
The New York City Police Department maintains a large
file of unsubstantiated information about juveniles from
which information has been given to welfare authorities,
courts and schools.
The State of Massachusetts maintains a Subversive Activity
Division in the State Office Building at Government Center in
downtown Boston which retains files on peace, antiwar, and civil
rights demonstrators. Up until April 1970, the information was
available to colleges and universities seeking Information

C. A case study of domestic intelllgencei
the Army's Continental United States Intelligence Network.
The intelligence hierarchy; the Army's
authority; early hlatory of CONUS Intelligence;
collection methods; Blacklist and Compendium;
status in 19^9; usefulness of computer files;
collection, processing, and dissemination; the
outcry of 1970t movements toward reform; some
observations.
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INTRODUGTIQN
This section presents a detailed study of the Array's
maintenance of tntelllgence files, especially personality
files and blacklists, describing the lawful political activities of
Individuals and groups. Primary interest is focused on
those files used for civil disturbance purposes, rather than
on files used for security clearances and direct threats
against Army property,
THE INTELLIGENCE HIERARCHY
There are two separate chains of command which maintain
intelligence capabilities. The Intelligence Command (USAINffiC)
Includes the Military Intelligence (MI) groups whose primary
function is security clearance investigations. There are
about 300 MI branch offices throughout the U.S., with 5 to
50 agents assigned to each branch office. These groups report
directly to- USAINTC headquarters at Port Holabird, Maryland.
The second command Includes the stateside G-2's of the
Continental Army Command. These agents are trained to supply
intelligence in combat situations. At one time, the MI groups
were part of the G-2 units.
There is much duplication between these two groups. Both
formerly collected civil disturbance Information using similar
methods and both J)assed this information on to the domestic
intelligence section of the Counterintelligence Analysis
Detachment (CIAD) of the Office of the Army Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI).
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THE ARMY'S AUTHORITY
Under the "Inherent powers doctrine", some persons
Interpret Article 2 of the Constitution to imply that the
President may engage in whatever "intelligence-gathering
operations he believes are necessary to protect the security
of the nation". However, others, including Chrislbopher Pyle,
a doctoral candidate in law at Columbia University, claim
that this does not justify surveillance of lawful political
activity. According to Pylet
"(this) would probably be forbidden bjjr-^the Bill
of Rights. The reason is the chilling effect which
knowledge of surveillance has upon the willingness of
citizens to exercise their freedoms of speech, press, and
association, and their right to petition the government
for' redress of grievances. .. regardless of whether that
effect was intended."
(Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence j The Army Watches Civilian
Politics.")
The courtfe have accepted this contention. For instance,
in Anderson vs. Sills the New Jersey Superior Court declared
most of that state's intelligence system unconstitutional
because of a chilling effect.
Moreover, Pyle listed laws which "mark off the Army's
responsibility for law enforcement from that of other agencies."
He mentions several:
"These include not only statutes whdch restrict
the Army to a backup function in times of riot, but
the laws which assign surveillance of unlawful political
activity within the United States to the FBI and the
Secret Service. Other sources of the Army's authority
include the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which
permits investigation of unlawful political activity
within the armed services, and those laws and federal-
state agreements under ^hlch the Army governs many
of its Installations."
(Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence..'.')
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The use of the Army as backup has decreased In frequency
durlnp: the past two years by comparison to the rlot-actlve
years of I967 and 1968.
SOME EARLY HISTORY 01- CONUS INTELLIGENCE
The CONUS (Continental United States) Intelligence
program began In the siimmer of 1965. It was supposed to
provide an early warning system for civil disorders In which
the Army might be required to Intervene.
The year 196? was marked by the Detroit and Newark
riots, and the Peace March on the Pentagon. As a result of
the events In Detroit, Cyrus Vance was appointed to head a
commission to see what went wrong In Detroit. Among the
conclusions of the commission was a recommendation for
better Intelligence. Several high officials In the Army
thought that the computer could bf used for the prediction
of riots. Unfortunately, computer predictions are no better
than the programmed procedure that humans use to Instruct
the computet. It is clear that the capabilities of computers
were not at all understood by the people that decided to use
them. Also in I967 the Army widened Its scope to Include
Intelligence gathering on the political beliefs and activities
of individuals and organizatlortssactive in the civil rights,
white supremacy, black power, and anti-war movements.
In 1968, the riots after Martin Luther King's death
resulted in the need for rapid movement of troops to Washington,
Baltimore, and Chicago. Thus the "Domestic VJar Room" came into

-92-
existence as the Army prepared to fight In 25 cities simul-
taneously. The Domestic War Room Included 200 men and a
microfilm file including Information from the FBI, state,
and local officials. The files included packets on 150
urban areas, containing logistics inforaatlon and, according
to Pyle, information on individuals and groups such as the
Young Americans for Freedom, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
Rear Admiral Arnold E. True and Brigadier General Hugh B.
Hester (war critics), Georgia State Representative Julian
Bond, and folk singers Joan Baez, Phil Ochs, and Arlo Guthrie.
(Pyle, "CONUS Revisited..."). The Domestic War Room cost
an estimated $2.7 million.
Another file that was created was a biographic file which
could retrieve information on ^050 individuals, 500 ef whom
were not in the Army. This system was built using spare
computer time by a lower-level officer who thought it would
be useful. Officials at higher levels were unaware of the
file's existence.
COLLECTION METHODS
Most of the information was obtained indirectly. There
were many sources! newspapers and other media, local police,
campus police, state police, FBI, Secret Service, and perhaps
others. Overt observation was also used. Information
collected in the field was usually reported by teletype to
the U.S. Army Intelligence Command where the Director of
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Investlgatlons Is responsible for storlnp- the Information
and forwardinp: it to appropriate Department of Defense officials,
An "agent report" will follow if the agent deems the incident
of lasting value to the Army. Some former agents claim that
performance is measured on the basis of volume and speed
(sometimes implying the necessity for beating the Associated
Press)) A military spokesman has denied this, claiming
that an agent vjould have to Justify a meaningless report to
his branch leader. Consider, however, the following incident
report:
"PHILADELPHIA, PAt MEMBERS OF THE VIETNAM WEEK
COMMITTEE COMPOSED LARGELY OF PROFESSORS AND STUDENTS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, WILL CONDUCT A
"SLEEP- IN" TO PROTEST THE SCHEDULED APPEARANCE OF DOW
CHEMICAL COMPANY RECRUITERS ON CAMPUS. THE NEXT DAT,
19 MARCH, THE SAME ORGANIZATION WILL SPONSOR A PROTEST
RALLY ON CAMPUS."
v(Pyle, CeNUS INTELLIGENCE ...")
The relevance of this report to nation-wide planning for
riot control Is difficult to see.
Several examples of Army infiltration of civilian groups
have been cited, Including the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, the National Mobilization Committee, the Poor
People's Campaign, and a Ylppie commune on DuPont Circle durlnp-
the Coujnter inaugural in 1969. Army agents posed as students
at NYU, Columbia, City College of New York, and Fordham, were
arrested at Howard University in Washington, D.C. for throwing
rocks at police, posed as press photographers and newsmen, and
pretended to be television reporters from the "Midwest News
Service" interviewing demonstrators in Chicago, Washington,
and Catonsvllle, Maryland.
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The Army has even observed the Presidential Conventions.
In Miami In I968 the Army had agents on the convention floor.
During the Democratic Convention in Chicago, according to
Pyle, Army agents "posed as TV camera crews,... and two
plainslothesmen from the staff of the Army Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence occupied assigned seats
within the convention hall." This latter action occurred
despite the CIAD's correct predictions that federal troops
would not be needed.
The Army claims that all of these covert operations
took place with the concurrence of the F.B.I.
In February 1969» Undersecretary MoGifSert wrote a
memo stating th-^t his approval was required, in addition to
that of the P.B.I. , for anyycovert operations. The Army
claims that no nne has asked for this approval. There is
indication that this policy is not being followed at lower levels,
based on examples cited by former agents. For instante,
according to Pyle, one of Oliver Pelrce's assignments with
the Sth MI detachment at Fort Carson, Colorado was»
"To Infiltrate a group called the Young Adults
Church Project (YAP), which was established by a
coalition of local church groups, the Young Democrats,
and a ski club to operate a recreation caater for
emotionally disturbed young people. Although the
project was entirely non-politlcal, Peirce said, he
and a soldier- informant were directed to make detailed
reports on its meetings because one of the group's
founders had attended anti-war demonstrations outside
the fort and had once been a member of SDS."
(Pyle, CONUS Revisited...)
A spokesman for the Army denies this, claiming that pthe
form^^r SDS'er had joined after the agent, that the arent
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hlmself had gone to the commanding officer offering to
report on this person, and that the commanding officer
'discouraged this reporting. The Army spokesman also
disputed another of Pyle's charges — that an Informaiit was
sent to the I968 SDS National Convention In Boulder,
Colorado. The spokesman claimed that two soldiers had been
Invited to attend the convention, that they did attend and
were disappointed, and that they reported this.
Pelrce also claimed thatt
"(the) 5th MID.
.
.assigned five undercouier agents
to monitor an anti-war vigil In the chapel of
Colorado State College, maintained two full-time
infiltrators within the local peace movement, and
sent others to observe meetings of the Colorado
Springs poverty board."
(Pyle, CONUS Revisited...")
Moreover, Pelrce claimed that these operations duplicated
those of FBI, local, and state police, and the Colorado
Springs off irfeyofM thd. 113th MI group.
BLACKLIST AND COMPENDIUM
From May 1^, 1968 to February 2U-, I969 the Army published
a blacklist, which they called an "identif icatdon list".
This list, which contained mug shots and vital statistics on
controversial citizens who the Army claimed had been active
in past civil disturbances, was sent to 150 Array Intelligence
end troop units, plus the F.B.I., the Justice Department,
Naval and Air Force Intelligence, the C.IM., and the U.S.
embassies in West Germany and Canada. However, Pyle claimed
that the Army "failed to mention that the list also contained
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detailed descriptions of persons and organizations never
Involved in civil disturbances." (Pyle, CONUS Revisited...").
The CompendiiAin was a two-volmne loose-leaf encyclopedia
termed the "Coionterintelllgence Research Projecti Cities
and Organizations sof Interest and Individuals of Interest."
The South Bend MI branch office prepared dossiers on individuals
to go into the Compendium. These dossiers were 5x7 cards
which Included a picture of each person as well as his name,
address, occupation, background, record of political groups
with which he was affiliated, a list of political meetings,
rallies, and demonstrations attended, and a svimmary of
the subject's political views on various issues.
STATUS IN 1969
By 1969 the Army kept the following files of civil
dlstrubance information:
1. Fort Holabi3?d computer file, including a biographic
file.
2. Microfilm archive in the Domestic War Room.
3 3. Blacklist and Compendium.
^. Continental Army Command computer file at Fort
Monroe.
5. Local files maintained by MI branch offices (300
of them)
.
6. Local files maintained by stateside 0-2 's.
USEFULNESS Of COMPUTER PILES
Army officials have admitted that the information collected
on civil disturbance was of little use in predicting civil
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dlsturbance needs. As early as 1968 Undersecretary
McGiffert wrote asking why the Army was collecting the
Information. Memos on this subject haare been flowing from
civilian leaders to military for the past two years, but
there was no policy change before 1970.
These civil distnirbancesf lies did serve the curiosity
of the Pentagon brass. Many generals called up regularly
to obtain Information on controversial personalities they
saw on the news. One intelligence agent wrote an unclassified
report of SDS chapters at four Pennsylvania colleges for
a general and his daughter,
COLLECTION. PROCESSING. DISSEMINATION
There seems to have been little thought as to what
information was collected. Collection decisions were made by
the local ap:ents. Due to the tremendous volume of information,
there was probably liitle checking for accuracy, especially
in the case of information obtained through IdAson with local
officials.
L istributir)n of the information showed a similar lack
of planninp-. Agents traded Informatimi with local officials
and the I.B.I., although this was against Intelligence Command
policy (one such incident occurred in the 113th MI group in
1969). The distribution of doctoents such as the Compendium
Included the Panama and European commands. She Compendium
was also distributed to federal agencies such as the Civil
Service Commission, the Secret Service, and the F.B.I. There vas
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no such thing as "need to know"
.
TdE OUTCRY OF 1970 t MOVEMENTS TOWARD REFORM
In January 1970 Christopher Pyle, a former Captain
in Army Intelllgiance, published an article entitled "CONUS
Intelligence! the Army watches Civilian Politics" in the
Washlnp:ton Monthly . He also began to work closely with
NBC ("First Tuesday'; December 1, 19701, with WGBH In Boston
("The Advocates", October 27, 1970), and with the press.
Pyle's first article described the CONUS Intelligence rirocram
and its dangers. Much of his information was obtained by
debriefing foamer Army agents.
In the period immediately following the publishing of
his first article, according to Pyle, the Pentagon's Office
of Public Information refused comment. Aiio, Pyle claimed
that "agents were forbidden to discuss any aspect of the program
with newsmen and were warned that any who did would be pro-
secuted for breach of national security." (Pyle, "CONUS
Revisited..."). The relevant files were classified to prevent
public access to any information.
On the 22nd of January, Senator Ervin sent a letter to
Stanley Resor, Secretarjr of the Army, concerning a "survey
of the development and maintenance of databanks by Federal
Departments and agencies." He went on to describe this
study:
"One of our purposes is to determine whether or
not such data systems are beipig developed in accordance
with constitutional standards of privacy and due process
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of law for the Individual citizens Involved. Another
purpose Is to help Congress ascertain the need for
'comprehensive legislation to goveam all computerized
databanks on individuals.
"Our attention has been particularly directed to
reports of the development and expansion of databanks
at Fort Holablrd, containing information on the personalities,
6b the political, economic and social beliefs and on
the lavrful community activities of American citizens.
"To assist the Subcommittee In its study, we should
--appreciate your explaining to usj (l) the present
situation concerning collection and storage of Army
intelligence and other investigative data on private
individuals, particularly at the Investigative Records
Repository, but also at other data centers operated by
the Army; and (2) future plans for expanding and further
computerizing the present system."
Senator Ervln asked sixteen specific questions.
While Ervin received no answer at that time, the Army
released a statement on January 26th. Pyle, in his second
article, calls this statement
"...the first in a series of partial admissions.
In the Jargon of the spy trade, such admissions are
known as "plausible denials" because they are Invested
with just enough truth to mask an essential falsehood.
Thus the Array confirmed the existence of the nationwide
intelligence apparatus (true) but said it collected
political Intelligence only "in connection with Army
civil disturbance responsibilities" (false). .."This
is incident information only and does not include
individual biographies or personality data" (false)."
(Pyle, t:0KUS Revisited)..")
Fyle also disputed Army claims with respect to infiltration
and the blacklist.
Meanwhile, letters similar to Ervin 's were sent to the
Army by Congressman V Gallagher and Senators Williams, Hart,
Dole, Brooke, Percy, lulbrlght, and Cook. Throughout the first
part of February no response was made to these inquires.
Congressman Gallagher became upset enough to threaten to hold
hearings. The delay in an adequate response was in part due
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to the fact that the Army's civilian hierarchy, which
is supposed to supervise the military structure of the Army,
was as surprised as the Congressmen when they learned the
full extent of the situation. from Pyle's first article.
In the face of such pressures, Robert E. Jordan, General
Counsel for the Army, determined to find out what was poin^
on, and spoke to the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence. He was particularly Interested in the biographic
file to which Pyle had referred. However, according to Pyle,
the Assistant Chief of Staff "greatly downplayed the CONUS
system's capabilities." It seems proper to assume that
either he or the officers Immediately under him knew about
the biograrihic file. Jordan then vrent to 1 ort Holablrd , where
the existence of the biographic file was not disclosed
(possibly due to confusion during the briefing). Finally,
in mid-P ebruary, Jordan went to the computer operator, asked
for a printout on Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. , and watched
as the computer printed a lengthy list of references to
hrs. King.
On the 25th of February, Jordan sent a form letter to the
more than thirty Congressional inquiries, including Senator
Erttn's letter of January 22. Each received the same letter
regardless of the questions he had asked. Jordan first told
of the Army's concern over Fyle's allegations because of
the American tradition tkAt separated the military from
domestic politics. He minimized the Army's intelligence
role in the civilian sector, and Insisted that the Army has
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long creferred to have civilian agencies meet these
Intelligence requirements. Jordan then went on to descl'ibe,
in ^reat detail, 'the Army's role in security clearance
Investigations (which was never at issue). Finally, in
speaking about civil disturbance Information, he Insisted that
the Army's legitimate concern did not Include "minor forms
of disturbances and lawful activities not likely to lead to
maijor disturbances involving the use of federal resources."
He claimed that the program has been under constant review,
and that the widely distributed blacklist had been ordered
destroyed. Furthermore, the F^'ort Holablrd computer data
bank "which included information about potentlAl Incidents
and individuals involved in potential civil disturbance
incidents" was destroyed because it did not help predict
trends. He stated that "no comptiter databank of civil
disturbance information is being maintained, and directives
provide that no such system can be initiated without the
approval of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the
Army .
"
Mr. Jordan did not answer Senator Er*±n's l6 specific
questions from the January 22 letter. In particular, he
failed to mention any other databanks containing investigative
data on private individuals. However, Pyle, In his July
article, listed several of these other databanks!
1. 375 copies of a tww-volume loose- leaf e encyclopedia
on dissent compiled by CIAD (the Compendium).
2. Microfilm archives in the Domestic War Room. (Jordan
did not find ort about these imtil ^Bestioned Toy
Congressman Gallagher)
.
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3. Gompiiterized databank on civil disturbances,
political protests, and resistance in the Army
(RITA) at the Continental Army Command HQ,
Port Monroe, Va.
^'. Non- computerized regional databanks at each
stateside Army command and at many military
installations.
5. Non-computerized files at most of the Intelligence
Command's 300 stateside intelligence group offices.
Congressman Gallagher seemed pleased with Jordan's
response, though Pyle claimed he was aware sof the omissions.
Ervln was not satisfied, and on the Senate floor on Narch 2,
1970, he stated that "while the Army's response is commendable,
it raises more questions that it answers, and leaves a great
many of the old questions unanswered." He wrote Secretary
Resor on P'ebraary 27th requesting a complete report, especially
with regard to civil distnrbance databanks.
At about this time, according to Pyle, Congressman
Gallagher received word regarding the reaction In the lower
ranks of the Army to the public outcry:
"On the morning after news reports about the
dismantling of the CONUS system first appeared in the
Washington papers. . .members of the ll6th were. .
.
Informed that their unit and its operations would be
unaffected.... Files kept by the regional MI groups
...would remain intact. . .and members of the MI groups
would continue their operations of surveillance.
Infiltration, and reporting as previously."
(Pyle, "CORUS Revisited. . .")
In addition, Pyle mentioned that the ll6th's files
were classified to prevent their release. These files
included a 5x7 card file on several thou^'and people in the
Washington area.
following Jordan's second surprise, this time vrith the
i;
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mlcrofilm archive, the civilians in the Army began a
concentrated effort to find out what was going on. On March
6, Secretary Hesor sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of
the Army requesting that he find out what computer systems
existed. He repeated the Army policy toward such computerized
systems as contained in Jordan's February 25th letter. On
April 1, 1970, the Adjutant General, Kenneth G. V/lckham,
forwarded this request to the commanding generals. This letter,
at one time classified, also requested a report on non-computerized
Information files. related to activities, including civil
disturbances, which Involved civilians not affiliated with
the Department of Defense. One computerized dita bank was
uncovered at Port Hood, which the Army ordered destroyed after
tort Hood officials vinsuccessfully attempted to justify it.
On March 20, 1970, Undersecretary of the Army Thaddeus
Beal sent a long letter to Senator Ervin which he began by
describing the security investigation program for uniformed
members of the Army, civilian employees, and contractors'
employees who v/orked on Army contracts. He reiterated the
claim that no computer would be installed in the USAIRR, thou/^-h
the Defense Central Index of Investigations would be
cmmputerlzed. Beal also reiterated the Army policy toward
computer databanks, first mentioned by Jordan, and stated that
the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee would be Informed whenever
a computer databank was approved.
In describing the current policy toward the "spot report"
system, Beal stated that information concerning "butbreaks of
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vlolence or Incidents with a high potential for violence
beyond the capability of state and local police and the
National Guard to control" will be collected by llaiCDn with
other government agencies such as ttee P.B.I. , reported by
teletype to the Intelligence Command (not placed in a computer),
and destroyed after 60 days.
Seal next described CIAD, which was established in
OASCI to provide analysis such as civil disturbance estimates.
The files, received from the F.B.I,, are stored on microfilm,
v;lth a computerized index. CIAD is "closely supervised by
OaSCI and is not permitted to consider matters beyond its
limited area of concern." CIAD 4fe one time compiled and
identification list with limited distribution to Army organizations
with civil disturbance responsibilities.
Beal also wrote to Galiagher, claiming "the only other
Intelligence files concernlrcg civilians maintained by the
Army consist of the files maintained by the Counterintelligence
Analysis Division." But, as Pyle pointed out In his second
article,
"No reference was made to: 1) the Continental
Army Command's computer files at Fort Ndliroe, about
which Gallagher had made specific inquiries; 2) the
regional databanks kept by most of the 300 offices
of the Army Intelligence Command; or 3) similar records
maintained by the G-2's (intelligence officers) of
each stateside Army command and of many Army posts."
Pyle also disputed Deal's description of CIAD's
functions. In particular, he claimed the microfilm files
existed to "sitlsfy the curiosity of the Pentagon's brass."
Nor, says Pyle, did Beal mention the size of the microfilm
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file (100,000 frames for worldwide Intelligence Information),
or the card files on dissident individuals and groups.
Moreover, Pyle mentioned several non-military organizations
which received copies of the blacklist.
However, Seal's constraints on the Army were substantial,
and Gallagher appeared satisfied.
During March, the ACLU brought suit against various
high-ranking officials of the Army. The suit charged that
the databanks and blacklists violated the Bill of Rights
because of the effect which knovrledge of siich activities
can have upon the ^willingness of citizens to exercise their
freedoms of speech, press, association, aB<ftl{)fttAtion. The
plaintiffs v'ere 13 individuals and organizations whose
non-violent, lavjful politics had been the subject of widely
distributed Army reports. The Judge refused to hear testimony
and dismissed the case, which is currently being appealed.
On June 9, Colonel Robert E. Lynch, acting Adjutant
General, sent a policy statement to all commanding generals.
It established "p61icy regarding the collection, reporting,
processing, and storage of civil disturbance information."
He mentioned reliance on the Justice Department for civil
disturbance Information needs. Lynch stated:
"Under no circumstances will the Army acquire,
report, process, or stoie civil disturbance information
on civilian individuals or organizations whose activities
cannot, in a reasonably direct manner, be related to
a distinct threat of civil distrubance exceeding the
law enforcement capabllltes of local and state aTithoritles,
except as authorized in paragraphs 8 and 9d .
"
Paragraph 8 stated that "civil disturbance plans and supporting
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materials will not include listings of organizations
and cersonalitles not affiliated with the Department of
Defense", excluding, of course, locil officials who have
civil disturbance duties. Paragraph 9d stated that "after-
action reports, where required for clarity, may contain names
of individuals or organizations that were directly involved in
the dlvll disturbance being reported. Inclusion of names of
organizations and individuals will be kept to the absolute
minimupi for the purpose of the report."
Lynch also made several other policy statements. Army
intelligence resources can only be used for collection of
civil disturbance Information when DCDFO "has made a determination
that there Is a distinct threat of civil disturbance beyond
the capability of local and state officials to control." At
these times, MI elements will maintain llason with appropriate
local, state, and federal authorities, using other means of
collection only on order of the Department of the Army, and
will employ covert means only with concurrence of the F.B.I,
and api->roval by the Undersecretary of the Army. CONARC can
process civil disturbance informatinn only when their troops
are on standby status or are already assisting local officials.
"Adverse civil disturbance Information relating to persons
or organizations. . .will not be stored except on order of the
Department of the Army." Spot reports will be destroyed within
60 days and ('all other accumulated files, after a civil disturbance,
will be destroyed or turned o:^er to the Department of Justice.
These policies did pot cover "personnel security programs,
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counterintelligence operations, and special collection
requirements related to direct throats to Army personnel,
Installations, or material." Direct threats do not Include
antl-vrar protests and similar events. A copy of the complete
letter is contained in the Appendix.
On July 29, 1970, Senator Ervin spoke out in Congress
again, statlngi
"I am convinced that this public concern is caused
by the failure of some agencies to limit their information
activities to those reasonably necessary for administration
of the laws they are charged by Congress with administering.
It is also caused by the failure of responsible officials
to Inform the public and Congress honestly and squarely
just why the informatimn is needed, and what will be
done with it, and it is caused by their frequent failure
to assure due process fed) individuals who might be
involved vjith the program or placed in a data bank."
He then wbnt on to describe his correspondence with the Army.
In addition to his Interest in the constitutional issues, Ervin
mentioned another reason for his interesti
"the Army's data banks. . .appeared to be part
of a vast network of intelligence-oriented systems
which are being developed willy-nilly throughout our
land, by government and by private industries. I
believe that in these systems, where they contain
the record of the individual's thoughts, beliefs,
attitudes, habits, and personal activities, there
may well rest a potential for political control and for
intimidation which is alien to a society of free men."
Ervin also described letters he had written to Stanley
Resor (July 27), to Melvin Laled (July 20), and to John
M' tchell (June 9). Early in December, Robert Jordan answered
the letter to Resor and part of the Laird letter. He mentioned
an inspection program begun on July 13 to Insure that the
instructions specified in Lynch ' s letter are being carried out.
Unfortunately, no new ififormf^tion was revealled in hjB letter.
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and the answers to some questions, such as those relating to
the specific subject areas concerning an Individual's backprox^nd
,
tDersonal llle, personality, and habits that are noted In
each data bank were vap;ue and Incomplete. Jordan also mentioned
that after the June 9 letter, the Army deleted all references
to "essentially civil disturbance Information" froBi the
comtjuterlzed index to the GIAD microfilm archive. Accord Ing
to another Anriy spokesman, the Lynch policy implied that CIAD
should not answer unnecessary requests from curious generals.
The controversy flared again when Senator Ervin charged
that the Army had spied on Senitor Adlai Stevenson, former
Governor Otto Kerner, and Representative Abner J. Mikva, all
of Illinois. This charge vjas based on allegations made
by James O'Brien, a former Army intelligence agent. The
Army denied these charges, but apparently a dossier on Stevenson
was kept in the files under "Operation Breadbasket".
On December 23rd, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird announced
a reorganization of military intelligence operations to bring
them under stricter civilian control and to ensure that they
v'ould be "conpletely consistent with constitutional rights, all
other legal provisions, and national security needs." He
also announced a sweeping review to take place by February 1,
1971. He said, "These activities must be conducted in a
manner v;hich recognizes and pceserves individual human rights."
According to Ervin's aides, these proclalmatlons may in fact
have very little impact on the problem.
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OBShRVATIONS
The Army has tried to deal with riots as conspiracies,
citing the usefulness of blacklists In breaking- up p-uerllla
organizations In Southeast Asia. The National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders found such analysis worthless
In evaluating ghetto riots.
In fact, at the height of the Detroit riots. General
Yarborough Instructed his staff In the Domestic War Roomt
"Men, get out your counterinsurgency manuals. We have an
Insurgency on our hands." As one officer later observed,
"There we were plotting power plants, radio stations, and
armories when we should have been locating the liquor and
color-television stores Instead." (Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence...").
Even though the intelligence network was ineffective and
unjustified, the Army bureaucracy worked very slowly to
significantly reduce the domestic intelligence program. In
fact, two years of letters between the civilian and military
leaders produced no changes. Reductions in the programs
were undertaken only in the face of severe Congressional
pressure triggered by Pyle's articles. As Pyle saidj "Without
the threat of hearings, the Army's civilian leaders are not
likely to end their evasions and deceptions, admit the full
scope of the program, or reconsider its needs or consequences.
They are the crisis managers of their bureaucracy. Threats,
not suggestions, determine their agenda." With no crisis
to force an overall evaluation of the domestic intelligence
program, collection of data became a goal in itself as Individ no 1
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members of the bvireaucracy tolled to build their ovm small
empires through always having enough data to answer anv question
which came down from above.
Simply Issuing a directive Is an empty gesture. In order
to be effective, such directives must be communicated, understood,
and followed. There have been several Instances vihere Army
directives have suffered lengthy comm-unlcations delays, and
where orders that were properly delivered were misunderstood
.
Moreover, Instances of conscious concealment of facts from higher
officers have been alleged. It might not be too surprising
to discover that the present strict policies are not being
strictly enforced. To take one example, former agent Edvrard
Sohler reports that when the CIAD received the order to destroy
the Compendium, they first archived all of the information on
microfilm.
It appears that temporary military men — the "in-and-
outers" — who were willing to speak out against Army policies
were responsible for whatever changes heve been made to date.
-oth '^yle and the agents he interviewed were temporary men.
The structure of the military establishment is such that the
Incentive for career officers is not to rock the boat. Such
changes as we have seen would in all likelihood not occur in
an all-volunteer Army. Moreover, there appears to be even
less incentive for change in the Justice Department System.
The Army may be misusing the classification system, in
violation of the Freedom of Information Act. For example,
Wickham's letter of April 1 was classified on no Justifiable
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basis, as were the files of the ll6th MI mentioned above.
The military high command, the civilian hierarchy, and
the authors of this report all experienced considerable
difficulties in discovering the actual facts. According to
Schler,
"A lot of Intelligence people felt no responsibility
to tell the truth to anybody outside the Intelligence
community"
(Sunday Herald Traveler, Sec. 3, page 15» Jan. 3,1971 Boston)
including the Army general counsel. Schler claimed that
one team of which he was a member lied outright to Jordan
about the microfilm files.
Moreover, many military officials are very difficult to
interview. Although we were received graciously, they
volunteered little Inf ormatlion, and only answered the questions
they were asked. Therefore, an interviewer who goes armed
with Insufficient facts is unlikely to uncover the important
aspects of the situation. In addition, potentially embarasslng
questions are frequently met with categorical denials, which
upon more specific questioning are retracted.
VJe fo\and the civilian hierarchy much more open during
an interview.
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L. Potential future Problems
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In his first article, Pyle dealt with the dangers
inherent in the domestic intelligence conununttyj
".
. .it is not enoup^h to reform the Army. The
Intelligence Command is only ohe member of a huge,
informal community of domestic intelligence agencies.
Other members of the community include not only the
l-BI, the Secret Service, the Air Force, and the Navy,
byt hundreds of state and municipal police departments.
Some of the latter are surprisingly large. $he Nev
York City Police Department's Bureau of Special
Set^vices, for example, employs over 120 agents and has
an annual budget in excess of :$1 million.
"Each of these organizations now shares with the
Army the capability to inhibit people in the exercise
of their rights, even without trying. 3y collaborating,
they could become a potent political force in their
ov:n right. Thus as the Army, the PBI, and the Justice
Department strive to coordinate these agencies through
the establishment of wire services, hot lines, and
computerized data banks, it is essential that the
American nubile and its representatives be equally
energetic in the impostiSion of checks and balances. In
particular, special efforts should be made to prevent
needless concentrations of information. She United
States may be able to survive the centralization of
intelligence files without becoming totalitarian, but
it most certainly cannot become totalitarian without
centralized intelligence files. The checks must be
designed with the most unscrupulous of administrators
in mind. The fact that we may trust the current heads
of our investigative agencies is no guarantee that
these agencies wlUnot one day come vmder the control
of men for whom the investigatory power is a weapon
to be wielded against political and personal foes."
It is not possible sto over-emphasize the volume and
complexity of the problems related to access control and
quality of data that arise as data banks and communications
systems are interfaced. Valldotion of sensitive data obtained
through a nation-wide conglomeration of systems such as are
evolving In America would be a nearly Impossible task.
But even successful prevention of such interfacing will
not solve the problem. The rather complete lack of incentives
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for system builders to provide privacy controls, asoupled
with a lack of understand. In p; of the meaning of privacy cause
systems to tend towards being viorse Instead of better. One
systeir which should be watched carefully Is that maintained
by the Justice Department, which has no "In-and-outers" to
serve as its conscience, and which has taken over the duties
which Army intelligence has recently dropped.
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PART IV t CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOE THE FUTURE

-116-
Concluslons
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JUSTPICATION POR CONCERN
1. There is a v.'ldespread public Ignorance of the effect of
everyday actions upon Individual privacy.
2. In spite of substantial concern over the Invasions of
privacy expressed by all branches of p'ovemment, by the
private sector, and by the media, the Tnechanlsms for
nrivacy protection in America are very few and very veak.
WHAT IS PRIVACY
1. There is no comprehensive definition of privacy which is
widely accepted; however, at least one excellent definition
existsi
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to v:hat extent information about them is communicated to
others. ... The Individual's desire for privacy is never
absolute, since parSil44p4ti6nalnisociety Is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment process... In the face
of pressures from the curiosity of others and from the
processes of surveillance that every society sets in
order to enforce its social norms."
(Westin, A., Privacy and Freedom )
2. Privacy serves four essential functions! it provides
personal autonomy; it provides emotional release; it
allows self-evaluation and introspection; and it allows
for controlled transfer of information.
3. Much evidence exists that privacy is a biological
necessity for homo sapiens.
4. The privacy decision is a tradeoff between the individual's
desire to be, in fact, individual, and his desire to
partake in society. Society places constraints on this
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declsion through its various institutions.
PRIVACY AMD THE LAW
1. Privacy vms not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
because It vjas much less a problem than it Is now. If
the Constitution is read in the context of the time in
which It was written, then It is clear that the writers
protected privacy in every way they know how.
2. The Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy as
being implicit in a free society, but their definition
of "privacy" has been very narrow indeed.
3. A number of Constitutional bases for the right to nrlvRcy
exist In the 1st, ^!bh, 5th, and li|-th Amendments, but
the Interpretation by the courts has varied from case
to case.
^. Kany technical barriers Inherent in the legal system
make it difficult, if not impossible, for a private
citizen to bring suit and win on the grounds of invasion
of privacy, especially If the suit is against the
government.
5. Advancing technology, particularly in terms of high speed
Information processing devices, is rapidly destroying
whatever competence the courts had in dealing with
privacy issues.
6. The doctrine of the Chilling Effect on civil liberties
has basis In law going back to 19^7- Again, Interpretation
by the courts has varied
.
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;-[0W PRIVACY IS INVALED
1. Wethoflolopry for Invading- privacy ranges from simply
askln^r questions to search of available public records
to complete physical and psychological surveillance.
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
1. A very well-developed market exists for a wide range of
increasingly effective devices for covert collection of
i<4Ata. The buyers Include numerous government agencies
as well as uncountable private firms.
2. A market for counter-espionage devices exists, but it
is much less well-developed.
3. Industrial espionage causes losses of at least three
billion dollars per year.
4. The computer is an amoral Implement — it serves only
to amplify man's ability to process data for good or
evil purposes. The magnitude of that amplification
is extremely great.
5. A large variety of technical solutions to access control
and security issues related to computerized information
exist. These are not widely implemented due to a combination
of hl.vh (not excessive) cost, low incentive on the part
of system designers to consider privacy issues, and a
general lack of sophistication on the partt of government
and Industry System builders and of computer manufacturers.
6. Although not all of the technical difficulties have been
overcome, the primary problems with computers are human
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In nature, and should be the primary focus of our
attention.
Ah IiaTIAL SOLUTION AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
1, The most commonly proposed solution to privacy problems --
to let an individual see and correct his own file — is
oversimplistic on several counts; it 1) does not take
account of groups whose privacy is invaded, 2) assumes the
individual is qualified to correct his own record, and
3) does not account for conflicts of privacy.
2. A first cut at a solution couW. be to distinguish between
objectively provable fact and opinions and unverified
data.
Tlih CASE D-I I-aVOR OP' DATA BANKS
1. Collection of data is necessary for the existence of
society. Three main forces driving man to collect and
disseminate data are 1) the management functions of a
complex society, 2) the resolution of conflicts of
individual rights, and 3) the salue inherent in dissemination
of knovjledp-e. Major problems arise when InformatJon
collec ed for one of these three purposes is disseir'inateci
for anothf r.
GHITLRIA I- OH EVALUATION Of INDIVIDUAL DATA BANKS
i. The dimensions for evaluation are l) the criterie for
being Included as Inout, 2) the procedures for quality

-121-
control of data, 3) the inethodolopcy for processln/:-
row data to get useful Information, ^) access control
of output Inf orraatlon, and 5) t^ie social effects of
the system. The social costs must be traded off against
the social benefits.
JUSTIFICATION GIVEN FOR POLITLgAL INTELLIGENCE FILES
1. Reasons given for the existence of current files are
1) their deterrent power, 2) aid in apprehension of
criminals, 3) the necessity for preparedness to handle
•v j.cloTtoaeiit^ACttvttl-^st'i^) the public nature of the actions
involved, and 5) the assujnptlon that honest people
have nothing to hide.
2. These argioiuents are inadequate.
SURVEY OF EXISTING DATA BANKS
1. A very large niimber of local, state, federal, and private
agencies are currently In the business of collecting data
on citizens. The vast majority of such operations are
legitlmatis. Some are illegitimate. Almost all suffer
from important deficiencies In one or more of the
evaluation criteria.
THE ARMY'S CONUS INTELLIGENCr. IJETWOHK
1. Army leaders have admitted that much of the civil
disturbance information system was useless in that it
did not help to predict trends for use of federal troops
in civil disturbances.
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2. The Army has Issued orders to severely cut back civil
disturbance information collectlnn, processing, reporting,
and storage. They now rely on the JJtistlce Department
for much of this Information.
3. The most objectionable file was the computerized biographic
file which was created probably without the knowledge
of top military and civilian offlcialss
4. Collection methods included llason with local, state,
and federal authorities, overt observation, and covert
observation. The covert observation and infiltration,
was against official Army policy.
5. Civilian officials had a great deal of trouble discovering
the extent of CONUS Intelligence from their military
subordinates.
6. Letters from the Army to Congress were often Incomplete,
and, in some Instances, contained falsehoods.
7. The Army tried to deal with riots as conspiracies.
8. The civilian leadership of the Army worked quickly to
limit CONUS intelligence only under severe Conprressional
pressure caused by Pyle's articles. In the previous two
years, the program had been under review, but not
action had been taken. The civilian leaders' agendas
are determined by threats, not by suggestions.
9. CONUS Intelligence served the curiosity of Pentagon officials.
10. Army orders are not always communicated, understood, or
followed. Thus it is possible that their present strict
policies are not being carried out.
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11. Temporary military men were responsible for the chanp;es
to date.
12. The Army used the classification system to prevent
embarrassment
.
13. Military personnel are gracious but not helpful to
investigators of this problem. The civilian hierarchy
is much more open.
POTENTIAL FUTURE PROBLEMS
1. Concentration on the Army's problems has obscured the
many other data bases at all levels of government and
industry which are equally deserving of attention.
2. Prevention of the integration of the data bases which
form the intelligence network is highly desirable, since
problems with access control and data quality are very
n-ca much more severe in such integrated networks.
3. In addition, careful scrutiny must be given to individual
data bases, since the tendency is for them to go from
bad to worse if left alone.
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B. Hecommendatlons for the future
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We feel thot It is extremely Important to deal now
vlth the domestic irtelllp;ence community because there Is
presently no motivation for system builders to protect the
rlphts of American citizens, and because the social costs
of the systems which are evolving Is so great. Hovjever,
these recommendations may be applied to any data bank, either
manual or computerized
.
P'irst, a comprehensive national policy is needed. This
policy should approve of a data bank only If it serves a
legitimate need of a legitimate organization — that is, if
the data bank can be directly related to one of the three
forces for data collection. What is needed is a conscious
weighing of the social costs vs. the social benefits. In the
case of the Army, Pyle has said that we must
"define the Array's authority to monitor civilian
politics in light of such principles as civilian control
of the military, state and civilian primacy in law
enforcement, compartmentalization and decentralization
of intelligence duties, and obedience to the Constitutional
scheme of se-narate branches of government sharing
policy-making powers."
The r)hilosor)hy of the cost/benefit analysis should be
"guilty until proven innocent." There are at least three
types of social costs — 1) direct cost In resources expended
by the organization; 2) indirect cost due to the Chilling Effect
and the erosion of civil liberties; and 3) cost due to the
possibility of misuse by unscrupulous administrators. Six
Issues must be considered in evaluating social costs — 1)
the criteria for being Included as input; 2) quality control
of input data; 3) processing procedures; U-) access control of
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outDut Information; 5) the depree of centralization; and
6) interfaces v.'lth other systems.
In terms of benefits, the system should be related
In a very direct manner to one of the three forces for
data collection — t'iatoi s?rve the management function;
2) to aid in resolving conflicts of individual rights; or
3) to disseminate knowledge for its own sake. However, It
is also important not to hinder unnecessarily any institution
in its efforts to legitimately perform one of these functions,
We feel that such a policy could be stated as law.
Second, a means to enforce this policy is needed.
Enforcement must be carried to the lowest levels of affected
organizations. Furthermore, it is clear that present legal
means for dealing with existing (and future) data banks are
inadequate and must be improved so that It is possible to
show "invasion of privacy" In time to do something about it.
Preventive measures are needed due to the irreversible nature
of violations of privacy.
One way to implement this control might be a civilian
advisory board feervlng the same function for data banks that
Certified Public Accountants perform for company ledgers.
Careful consideration should be given to Senator Ervin's
proposal to
"create a Federal agency with powers to register
all data bank operations, military and civilian,
to demand justlf IcatAon for the records kept and
to enforce a cltlzenfts right to examine and to
challenge data vjhlch could haunt his reputation,
even his ability to earn a livelihood, for the rest
of his days.
"
(N.Y. Tines, 12/27/70)
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Hovever, legislative and Judicial action at all levels
Is not enoup;h; Individual citizens must be made cognizant
of the Issues and solutions that this report raises for
consideration. True, system builders must be educated in
the variety of technical considerations for protection of
privacy and given incentives to use them. Incentives for
further research should also be provided. But the job of
protecting our privacy lies neither with the systems programmer
nor with the computer manufacturer; it lies with us. Only
by increasing the sophistication of each iSltlzen in matters
regarding his relationship to the society in which he lives
can we prevent "freedom" from becoming an empty word in
America.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON. D.C, 20310
AGDA (M) (25 May 7 0) ACSI-CICD 9 June 1970
SUBJECT: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil
Disturbance Information
SEE DISTRIBUTION
1. PURPOSE. This letter establishes Department of the Army policy
regarding the collection, reporting, processing, and storage of civil
disturbance information. It is applicable within the Continental
United States, the States of Alaska and Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. It
applies to all Army commands within those geographic areas.
2. DEFINITIONS.
a. Civil disturbance -- A situation in which a civil jurisdiction
is required to apply a greater than usual degree of police enforcement
in order to insure the maintenance of law and order.
b. Civil jurisdiction -- A town, city, county, or State; a legal
corporate government v/ith'in the Continental United States, Alaska,
Hawaii, or Puerto Rico other than the Federal Government or its depart-
ments and agencies.
c. Collection -- For purposes of this policy, the acquisition of
information in any manner, to include direct observation, liaison with
official agencies, or solicitation from official or unofficial sources.
d. Law and order -- A condition in which a reasonable degree of
Che normal operations of a civil jurisdiction is possible.
e. Police enforcement -- That force available to a civil juris-
diction in order to insure law and order, such as a city police depart-
ment, a county sheriff's office. State police, or National Guard in
State service.
f. Processing -- The collation, evaluation, and analysis of raw
information in order to produce finished intelligence.
g. Reporting -- For purposes of this policy, communicating informa-
tion to another person or organization, whether orally, mechanically, or
eltctrically.
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AGDA (M) (25 May 70) ACSI-CICD 9 June 1970
SUBJECT: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil
Disturbance Information
h. Storage -- For purposes of this policy, the retention of
information in any way, to include card files, dossiers, folders,
computers, or punch cards.
3. GENERAL.
a. Public order is the responsibility of local and State govern-
ments and Federal civilian agencies. The Attorney General is the chief
Executive Branch officer responsible for coordination of all Federal
Government activities related to civil disturbances. Military forces
are responsible for action only when the President has determined, in
accordance with Chapter 15, Title 10, U.S. Code, that the situation
is beyond the capability of civilian agencies to control.
b. The investigative jurisdiction of the Army with regard to
espionage, sabotage, and subversion is in accordance with Executive
Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953. It is delineated in AR 381-115,
2 July 1969, and is limited to:
(1) The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories
involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.
(2) The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories
of civilian employees of the Army outside the United States and its
possessions.
(3) The disposal of cases on civilian employees of the Army inside
the United States and its possessions.
c. The Department of the Army relies upon the Department of Justice
at the national level to furnish civil disturbance threat information
required to support planning throughout the Army for military civil
disturbance needs.
d. The Department of the Army relies upon the Department of Justice
at the national level to furnish early warning of civil disturbance
situations which may exceed the capabilities for control by local and
Sc:.3::e authorities.
e. Under no circumstances will the Army acquire, report, process,
or store civil disturbance information on civilian individuals or organi-
zations whose activities cannot, in a reasonably direct manner, be related
to a distinct threat of civil disturbance exceeding the law enforcement
capabilities of local and State authorities, except as authorized in
paragraphs 8 and 9d.

-131-
AGDA (M) (25 May 70) ACSI-CICD 9 June 1970
SUBJECT: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil
Disturbance Information
4. COLLECTION.
a. Army intelligence resources will not be used for the collection
of civil disturbance information until the Director for Civil Disturbance
Planning and Operations, or the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLAOT) in
the case of Puerto Rico only, has made a determination that there is a
distinct threat of civil disturbance beyond the capability of local and
State authorities to control.
b. Army Military Intelligence elements possessing counterintelligence
resources v;ill maintain the capability to collect civil disturbance
threat information during a period in which there is a distinct threat
of, or actual, civil disturbance requiring the use of Federal military
forces.
c. Within the District of Columbia, the criterion is a distinct
threat of civil disturbance beyond the capability of the Metropolitan
Police to control.
d. Civil disturbance information collection capability of Army
elements in the Continental United States, Alaska, or Hawaii v;ill not
be employed except on Department of the Army order or, in the case of
Puerto Rico, on order of CINCIa.M>lT.
e. On activation by the Department of the Army, or CINCLAOT for
Puerto Rico, I-Iilitary Intelligence elements possessing counterintelligence
capability will:
(1) Establish and maintain liaison with appropriate local. State,
and Federal authorities.
(2) Through liaison, collect civil disturbance information concern-
ing incidents, general situation, and estimate of civil authorities as
to their continued capability to control the situation.
(3) Report collection results to Department of the Army, ATTN:
ACSI-IA, and DCDPO. In Puerto Rico only, report results to CINCLANT with
information copies to DA, ATTN: ACSI-IA, and DCDPO.
(4) Keep appropriate commanders informed.
(5) Provide intelligence support to the Pergonal Liaison Officer,
Chief of Staff, Army, and the Task Force Commander on arrival in the
affected area.
(6) Recommend methods of overt collection, other than liaison, if
required, to Department of the Army for approval.
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AGDA (M) (25 May 70) ACSI-CICD 9 June 1970
SUBJECT; Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil
Disturbance Information
f. Army Military Intelligence elements will employ methods of
collection other than liaison only on order of Department of the Army.
g. Covert agent operations will not be used to obtain civil dis-
turbance Information on individuals or organizations without the con-
currence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the specific approval
of each operation by the Under Secretary of the Army.
h. Unsolicited Sources.
(1) So-called walk-in sources who volunteer civil disturbance infor-
mation to Army elements will be referred to appropriate local police or
local offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If the source
refuses such referral the information will be obtained and immediately
furnished to the proper office.
(2) Information received from anonymous telephone callers or written
messages will be referred as indicated in paragraph 4h(l) above.
5. REPORTING.
a. Army elements will maintain the capability of reporting civil
disturbance information.
b. Civil disturbance information reporting will be activated only
on Department of the Army order. In Puerto Rico, reporting will be
activated only on order of CINCLANT.
6. PROCESSING.
a. OACSI, DA, has the sole responsibility for processing civil
disturbance information in accordance with the definition outlined in
paragraph 2 above at all times when Federal troops are not actually
placed on standby or committed.
b. When the Director of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations
directs that Federal troops be placed on standby or committed to assist
In restoring order, those Army elements involved will also be respon-
sible for processing civil disturbance information in support of their
local planning.
7. DISSEMINATION. Analyzed reports will be furnished to appropriate
major Army commands in CONUS , Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, when it
appears that a civil disturbance poses a distinct thrast beyond the
capabilities of local and State authorities to control.
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AGDA (M) (25 May 70) ACSI-CICD 9 June 1970
SUBJECT: Collection, Reportinc, Processing, and Storage of Civil
Disturbance Information
8. PLANNING. C5vil disturbance plans and supporting materials will
not include listings of organizations and personalities not affiliated
with the Department of Defense. Exceptions to this policy are:
a. Listings of local. State, and Federal officials whose duties
include responsibilities related to control of civil disturbances may
be compiled and maintained.
b. Appropriate data on vital public and commercial installations/
facilities or private businesses and facilities which are attractive
targets for persons or groups engaged in civil disorder may be compiled
and maintained.
9. STORAGE.
a. Army elements will be prepared to store civil disturbance infor-
mation during a period in which there is a distinct threat of, or an
actual, civil disturbance requiring the use of Federal military forces.
b. Adverse civil disturbance information relating to persons or
organizations within the Continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or
Puerto Rico, will not be stored except on order of Department of the
Army.
c. Spot reports generated by activation of civil disturbance infor-
mation collection will be destroyed within 60 days of the termination of
the situation to which they refer.
d. After-action reports, where required for clarity, may contain
names of individuals or organizations that were directly involved in
the civil disturbance being reported. Inclusion of names of organi-
zations and individuals will be kept to the absolute minimum for the
purpose of the report.
e. Upon termination of a civil disturbance situation, the nature
and extent of all accumulated files other than spot reports and after-
action reports will be reported to Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSI-CIC,
with recommendation for destruction or release to the Department of
Justice
.
f
.
Army elements will be prepared, on Department of the Army order,
to destroy accumulated files or forv/ard them to Department of the Army,
ATTN: ACSI-CIC, for release to Department of Justice.
g. Computerized data banks for storage of civil disturbance infor-
mation will not be instituted or retained without the approval of the
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army.
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AGDA (M) (25 May 70) ACSI-CICD 9 June 1970
SUBJECT: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil
Disturbance Information
10. The collection, reporting, processing, and storage of Information
related to Army personnel security programs, counterintelligence operations
and special collection requirements related to direct threats to Army
personnel, installations, or materiel are not affected by this letter.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
Colonel
Acting The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific
Commanding Generals:
US Continental Army Command
CONUS Armies and Military District of Washington
US Army Materiel Coimnand
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Strategic Communications Command
US Army Security Agency'
US Army Air Defense Command
US Army Intelligence Command
US Army SAFEGUARD System Conmiand
US Army Computer Systems Command
US Army , Alaska
Copies Furnished:
Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
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